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BROWNFIELDS, ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM, AND
INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINISM
WILLIAM W. BUZBEE*
At all levels of government, efforts are underway to rehabilitate the
many abandoned or underutilized industrial sites littering the United States
landscape. Particularly in the older cities of the Northeast and the Midwest,
these old industrial sites, commonly referred to as Brownfield sites (or
"Brownfields"), are seen as central to both the economic woes and economic
potential of these cities. At the present time, diverse local, state, and federal
programs exist to encourage Brownfields reuse. Critical to rehabilitating
Brownfields are questions about which levels or units of government should
be involved in such efforts. Policymakers aiming to facilitate Brownfields
reuse must assess the capabilities and track records of federal and state
governments in protecting environmental amenities, encouraging appropriate
economic development, and responding to hazardous substance problems.
This article's examination of past (and likely future) performance of federal
or state officials shows many years of federal environmental leadership but
more recent state environmental activism.
This article argues that generalizations about the merits and demerits
of federal, state, or local activism will usually fail to contribute to the
development of sound governmental policies. Such generalizations are
frequently rooted in normative views of federalism or antipathy to any
government or bureaucratic meddling in the absence of widespread market
failure. These generalizations sometimes amount to a sort of "institutional
determinism." By institutional determinism, I mean assumptions that
particular institutions will virtually always act in particular ways. The history
of Brownfields policy, and environmental laws generally, shows shifting
institutional roles, responses, successes, and failures. Rather than making
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assumptions of static institutional proclivities, policy analysts must examine
in more detail the historical context of a problem, the task and institution
under consideration to remedy that problem, and the particular constellation
of relevant environmental, market, and political pressures.
After reviewing the roots of Brownfields problems and changing
federal and state roles in Brownfields initiatives and environmental laws in
general, the article turns to an analysis of the dynamics of federal and state
environmental protection efforts. The article explores both why the federal
government has been for several decades the preeminent environmental
innovator and regulator, and why states have in recent years become
increasingly active. Both federal and state environmental activism are, at
least at first blush, unexpected under prevalent theories of legislation and
regulation. Environmental laws and regulations hinder and impose costs on
industrial polluters, who bear concentrated costs and have strong incentives
to fight environmental regulation. Beneficiaries of environmental regulation,
in contrast, are dispersed and benefited in a relatively minor way by pollution
control measures. As others have observed, entrepreneurial political activity
recognizing or catalyzing incipient citizen interest in environmental
protection explains the first stringent federal laws regulating industrial
polluters.
The durability of the federal period of environmental leadership,
however, has been less explored in previous scholarship. This article
develops the hypothesis that the durability of federal environmental
leadership is attributable in part to the fact that the federal government acted
before most states in creating substantive bodies of environmental law,
thereby gaining an advantage as the leader in developing a body of law
creating political benefits. As the regulatory "first-mover," the federal
government, primarily acting through the United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"), gained an advantage in expertise and
institutional commitment that even similarly motivated states had difficulty
matching, especially as regulated industry invested in compliance with
federal requirements. However, under federal laws and regulations that
allocated to states the initial or presumptive responsibility to implement
schemes to attain federal goals, states increased in competence and those
regulated became increasingly dependent on relationships with state
regulators. Hence, consistent with first-mover dynamics, states have
predictably copied and sometimes improved on federal innovations and
eroded the often more inflexible and bureaucratic EPA's preeminence as an
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environmental regulator. Nevertheless, the federal government has remained
generally ahead of states in its expertise and the rigor of its environmental
statutes and regulatory requirements. This durable federal leadership role is
likely attributable to the greater importance of issue-identity for federal
legislators and presidential candidates than for state and local officials, whose
elections more frequently turn not on issue stances but on party affiliation.
The article then analyzes additional reasons for recent state
environmental activism, particularly scrutinizing the sometimes-voiced
hypothesis that the states are now ready and willing to take over areas of
previous federal environmental primacy. As shown below, some areas of
state activism are just what they appear to be-reflections of states with
cultures particularly committed to protecting environmental amenities. Other
areas of state activism, however, particularly in the Brownfields area, appear
to be state efforts to protect state budgets or displace a more threatening
federal regulator and thereby respond to the concerns of polluters and perhaps
retain or attract new industrial investment. This analysis of state
environmental activism indicates that broad federal abandonment of
environmental leadership would likely result in decreased state environmental
protection. However, because environmental regulatory activism remains of
electoral interest to federal officials, particularly in responding to
environmentalists' and industry's joint calls for Brownfields rehabilitation,
we are unlikely to witness any such widespread federal abandonment of
environmental protection.
Part I reviews the Brownfields problem, previous scholarly and
political critiques of Brownfields issues, and current initiatives to rehabilitate
Brownfield sites. Part II then reviews elements and past critiques of
environmental federalism. Part III develops the hypotheses described above
to shed light on the dynamics of federal and state environmental activism.
The article closes by reviewing the history of environmental federalism and
showing how a perspective rooted in "institutional determinism" is
inconsistent with the ever-changing and dynamic interaction of state and
federal governments.
I. THE BROWNFIELDS PROBLEM
A. The Extent of Brownfield Sites
As defined by EPA and most analysts, a Brownfield site is a former
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industrial site that is now abandoned or underutilized and at least slightly
contaminated by hazardous materials.' At virtually all industrial complexes,
such environmental contamination creates risks of liability and may require
cleanup.2 Estimates of the numbers of such sites vary widely, in large part
because many sites are both unused and unassessed for environmental
contamination.3 Estimates usually range from 300,000 to 500,000 sites
across the nation.4
Many impacted constituencies seek remediation or the return to
See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., STATE OF THE STATES ON
BROWNFIELDS: PROGRAMS FOR CLEANUP AND REUSE OF CONTAMINATED SITES (1995)
[hereinafter OTA, STATE OF THE STATES] (giving the same definition and reviewing various
states' efforts to return such sites to use); William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose:
Voluntary Contamination Cleanup Approvals, Incentives, and the Costs of Interminable
Liability, 80 MINN. L. REv. 35, 40, 46 & n.31 (1995) [hereinafter Buzbee, Remembering
Repose] (similarly defining Brownfield sites and discussing different causes of
underutilization of such sites); Elizabeth Glass Geltman, Recycling Land. Encouraging the
Redevelopment of Contaminated Property, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1996, at 3,
3 ("Brownfields typically are characterized as abandoned, inactive, or underutilized
industrial sites located primarily in older central cities or suburbs."); Office of the Vice
President, Vice President Hails Progress in Urban Revitalization and Announces 20 New
Projects to Redevelop Brownfields 1 (June 13, 1996) (press release on file with the William
& Mary Environmental Law & Policy Review) ("Brownfields are abandoned pieces of
land-usually in the inner cities-that are lightly contaminated by previous industrial use
but pose no serious public health risk to the community.").
2 See, e.g., Robert S. Berger et al., Recycling Industrial Sites in Erie County: Meeting the
Challenge of Brownfield Redevelopment, 3 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 72 (1995); Buzbee,
Remembering Repose, supra note 1, at 40, 46; Geltman, supra note 1, at 3; John C. Wise,
Brownfields: Recycling Contaminated Urban Land, LAND USE & ENV'T F., Summer 1995,
at 140.
3 See Buzbee, Remembering Repose, supra note 1, at 39 n. 11; Joseph R. Dancy & Victoria
A. Dancy, Oil and Gas Issues Involved in CERCLA Reauthorization, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J.
103, 114-15 (1995); Bernard A. Weintraub & Sy Gruza, The Redevelopment of Brownsites,
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1995, at 57.
' See Urban Land Reclamation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Env't and
Aviation of the House Comm. on Science, Space and Tech., 103d Cong. 26 (1994)
(testimony of Charles Bartsch of the Northeast-Midwest Institute); OTA, STATE OF THE
STATES, supra note 1, at 4; Ned Abelson & Maura McCaffery, Brownfields: Recent
Massachusetts and Federal Developments, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2152 (Mar. 15, 1996)
(citing a U.S. General Accounting Office report estimating up to 425,000 sites).
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productive use of such sites.' Such sites, if left unused and contaminated,
lead to depreciated neighboring property values, pose potential environmental
and health risks to neighbors, contribute to perceptions of urban blight, and
contribute little or nothing to local economies.' In short, no one benefits
from the abandonment of such sites. However, as shown below,
rehabilitation of Brownfield sites offers many constituencies and institutions
political and economic benefits.7 The problem is deriving appropriate
policies and involving appropriate institutions to return such sites to
productive use, if such efforts are likely to succeed.
B. The Roots of the Brownfields Problem
Occasionally, critics of United States environmental laws and policies
identify Brownfield sites as a casualty of environmental laws and regulations
run amok.8 Under this view, the sizeable legal liabilities associated with
running a polluting industrial facility or owning a contaminated site are the
' See Buzbee, Remembering Repose, supra note 1, at 48-50 (discussing how citizens,
neighbors, municipalities, and industry all share interests in and have indicated desire to
reuse Brownfield sites if liability risks could be ascertained and capped); Georgette C.
Poindexter, Addressing Morality in Urban Brownfield Redevelopment: Using Stakeholder
Theory to Craft Legal Process, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 37, 59-62 (1995) (arguing that the
various impacted "stakeholders"-local residents, environmental justice advocates,
mainstream environmentalists, etc.-must compromise to reach acceptable cleanup
standards). But cf Weintraub & Gruza, supra note 3, at 69 (noting that "brownsite"
redevelopment is not in great demand by local communities for traditional micro-economic
reasons).
6 See Buzbee, Remembering Repose, supra note 1, at 48-51; Will Brownfields Initiatives
Really Work?, ENVTL. F., May/June 1995, 28-35 (1995) (discussing reasons for desiring
Brownfield reuse but noting that businesses have bypassed urban areas for new
development). But cf Geltman, supra note 1, at 3 (finding that most sites present
statistically low health risks to surrounding residents).
7 See discussion infra Part II.B.
E.g., Poindexter, supra note 5, at 50 ("Ironically, the legislative and policy initiatives
designed to spur and facilitate environmental cleanup are one of the largest obstacles to
remediating urban brownfields. Strict and mandatory adherence to arbitrary cleanup
standards does not provide an incentive to remediate, to the contrary, it deters any cleanup
efforts."); see also Dancy & Dancy, supra note 3, at 112-14 (offering examples of
CERCLA's ambiguity, EPA's recalcitrance in establishing definitive guidelines, the United
States Supreme Court's failure to address the constitutionality of retroactive provisions, and
the resultant widespread abandonment of redevelopment efforts).
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cause of the abandonment of America's industrial infrastructure.9 The reality
is far more complicated. While fears of environmental liabilities and costs
of environmental compliance are factors contributing to Brownfields
abandonment, a cause-effect attribution is in error.1" These Brownfield sites
are the product of many interrelated phenomena, many of which are unrelated
to environmental laws. Any solution that looks exclusively to environmental
laws is virtually sure to fail. This part first reviews the impact of
environmental liabilities on Brownfield sites, and then examines other non-
environmental contributors to the avoidance of Brownfield sites.
Environmental liabilities undoubtedly contribute to Brownfields
abandonment. Federal laws requiring industrial sources to control air and
water pollution add to the production costs of all U.S. industry." Costs to
comply with pollution control statutory schemes seldom, however, are
sufficiently large to drive otherwise profitable industry out of business. 2
9 John Wise, the Deputy Regional Administrator for Region IX of EPA's San Francisco
office, acknowledged that the liabilities associated with CERCLA property contribute to
redevelopment problems. Wise, supra note 2, at 141; see also Poindexter, supra note 5, at
47 (arguing that potential liabilities associated with brownfields and the heavy cost of
environmental cleanup hinders the redevelopment of abandoned sites).
10 See OTA, STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 1, at 5-10 (concluding that liability
uncertainties contribute to Brownfields abandonment but acknowledging other contributing
factors); JAMES BOYD ET AL., THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY ON
INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT: DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS,
Discussion Paper 94-03, at 21 nn.25-27 (Resources for the Future 1994) (showing through
case studies that other factors may surpass environmental liability concerns in explaining
Brownfield site underutilization); Robert Abrams, Comment, Superfund and the Evolution
of Brownfields Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 265 (1997) (showing
how the economics of rehabilitating Brownfield sites is likely the major deterrent to their
reuse).
I See Dancy & Dancy, supra note 3, at 104 (citing E. Donald Elliot et al., A Practical
Guide to Writing Environmental Disclosures, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,237, at
10,237 (May 1995), which states that taxpayers spend $185 billion per year, or 2.5% of
GNP, on environmental regulations).
12 While the dollar expenditures on environmental controls are high, expenditures by the
United States are not the highest percentage of Gross Domestic Product compared to the
advanced industrialized nations. See Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide
Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON
REG. 369, 375-76 (1993) (discussing complaints about pollution control expenditures);
Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE
L.J. 2039, 2065-67 (1993) (comparing various nations' expenditures on pollution control
and also discussing health and employment benefits to pollution control achievements and
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Marginal companies, however, can be driven out of business by such
compliance costs.13 Companies operating at the margin of profitability (or
bankruptcy) confront in environmental laws enacted since the 1960s, legal
obligations that do not automatically yield to threats of insolvency. As
confirmed by the Supreme Court, statutes such as the Clean Air Act ("CAA")
anticipate that in the process of cleaning up the environment, some industries
may have to shut down if compliance is impossible or inordinately
expensive. 4 The imposition of stringent and generally more costly "new
source" regulatory requirements under federal pollution control statutes to
"modified" facilities creates an additional cost disincentive to rehabilitate old
industrial facilities."
The federal environmental statutes most directly contributing to
Brownfields abandonment and avoidance are the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA") 6
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA").17 In its
sections regulating hazardous wastes, RCRA regulates such wastes from
"cradle to grave," while in another section concerning "corrective actions,"
sets forth obligations for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites that are no
new technology).
3 Robert Benson, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Comments at the University of Georgia
Red Clay Conference (Mar. 11, 1995) (reporting on study of metal plating industry that
revealed marginal plating operations were also big polluters and likely to go out of business
if forced to come into compliance). For an exploration of how potential insolvency of an
environmentally liable party impacts incentives of potentially responsible parties ("PRPs")
under CERCLA and CERCLA amendment proposals, see Lewis A. Komhauser & Richard
L. Revesz, Evaluating the Effects ofAlternative Superfund Liability Rules, in ANALYZING
SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND LAW 115-44 (Richard L. Revesz & Richard B.
Stewart eds., 1995).
14 See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) (rejecting an industry attack on a
CAA State Implementation Plan ("SIP") and stating that the Act gives state planners
authority to "force technology" even where it may result in loss of industry).
5 For example, under the CAA, New Source Performance Standards apply to both new
facilities and older facilities that have undergone "modifications." See 42 U.S.C. §
741 l(a)(2) (1994). This disincentive to the creation of new or upgraded facilities has been
criticized. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333 (1985).
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
1" Id. §§ 6901-6992. RCRA is also known as the Solid Waste Disposal Act, its name
before substantial amendments in 1984.
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longer operational. 8 CERCLA's and RCRA's corrective action provisions
overlap, but RCRA's corrective action provisions generally regulate
intentionally created waste disposal sites at the end of their intended use.
CERCLA operates as a catch-all liability scheme imposing potential strict,
and joint and several liability for often massive cleanup costs on any entity
owning, operating, or otherwise associated with the creation of a substantially
contaminated site. 9 Liability is not limited by one's capital investment in a
piece of contaminated property, but is measured by the costs of site cleanup.2"
Cleanups frequently dwarf the value of the contaminated land, creating
properties that, viewed in isolation, may have substantial negative value.2
EPA and the environmental enforcement arm of the Department of
Justice generally focus on sites on CERCLA's list of the nation's most
" See generally ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE AND POLICY 208-78, 391-93 (2d ed. 1996).
19 See id. at 201-07. Key to the view that CERCLA deters use or reclamation of
contaminated sites is its broad liability scheme. See Weintraub & Gruza, supra note 3, at
57; see also Poindexter, supra note 5, at 50 ("Where the possibility of contamination exists,
the uncertain magnitude of potential environmental liability discourages redevelopment
projects."); Wise, supra note 2, at 141 (noting that environmental concerns are "looming
larger" in the decision process, negatively impacting companies' decisions to redevelop
Brownfield sites). As construed by numerous courts, liability under CERCLA is strict, joint,
several and potentially eternal. See, e.g., Bell Petroleum Serv. v. Sequa Corp., 3 F.3d 889,
902-04 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining various courts' approaches whether to apply joint and
several liability); General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys. 920 F.2d 1415, 1418
(8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937 (1991); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d
160 (4th Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding landlord environmentally liable for tenant's activities); United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 204 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(2) (1994).
21 To say that sites have "negative values" is not the same as saying such sites will always
remain unused. In the dynamics of a multi-asset transaction, such a site may be passed to
an acquiror along with many other assets and liabilities. Furthermore, if a site must be
cleaned up under a federal or state law mandate, a company able to clean up a site in a more
cost-effective manner than a PRP owner may be willing to "buy" such land in a transaction
where the seller pays the buyer. See Buzbee, Remembering Repose, supra note 1, at nn.33-
55 and accompanying text (discussing transactional dynamics that would create incentives
to acquire and clean up contaminated sites if the extent of legal obligations were
ascertainable). RCRA similarly creates potentially large cleanup liabilities associated with
corrective action obligations, but such obligations are usually the subject of negotiation and
agreement with government officials. See id. at nn.89-98 (discussing RCRA sections
applicable to cleanups of contamination).
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contaminated sites, known as the National Priorities List ("NPL").22
CERCLA liabilities, however, can also arise out of cleanup activities in
emergency settings at sites not yet on the NPL 2 3 or in the context of private
cleanups which are followed by private cost-recovery actions. 24 Thus, in
addition to the over 1000 sites generally on the NPL at any point in time, any
site with a contamination problem potentially could give rise to CERCLA
liability.2 5
Further adding to the regulatory requirements associated with
22 See generally KATHERINE N. PROBST ET AL., FOOTING THE BILL FOR SUPERFUND
CLEANUPS 4 (1995) (detailing EPA's use of the NPL). The current hazard ranking that
places a site on the NPL was chosen by the EPA and can be modified. See OFFICE OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., COMING CLEAN: SUPERFUND PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED 115-16
(1989) (briefly describing the ranking structure of the NPL).
23 See Terry C. Clarke, A Practitioner's View of the National Priorities List, 2 ENVTL.
LAW. 57, 62 & n.21 (1995) (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 5598 (1991), 40 C.F.R. § 300.415 (1996)).
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B); J. Stanton Curry et al., The Tug-of- War Between RCRA
and CERCLA at Contaminated Hazardous Waste Facilities, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 359, 367
(1991).
25 CERCLA liability attaches to a wide variety of PRPs. The following categories of PRPs
may be liable for cleanup obligations: generators of hazardous substances disposed at a site,
past owners or operators of such a site at the time it became contaminated, current owners
or operators of a contaminated site (regardless of whether they participated in actions
contributing to such contamination), and transporters of hazardous substances who choose
such sites for disposal. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). These broad categories of PRPs have
further been expanded in broad interpretations by the EPA and courts adjudicating CERCLA
cases. Corporate affiliates, banks taking an active management role or perhaps only having
authority to impact waste disposal actions, trustees administering estates holding
contaminated sites, and even not-for-profits receiving real property donations all have been
held to be PRPs. See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837,
846 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 940 (1992) (holding passive owners liable for gradual
leaking of contaminants during their period of ownership); Portsmouth Redev. & Hous.
Auth. v. BMI Apartments Assocs., 827 F. Supp. 354, 358 (E.D. Va. 1993) (finding the same
liability for passive owners); Pantry Inc. v. Stop-N-Go Foods, 796 F. Supp. 1171, 1179 (S.D.
Ind. 1992) (finding the same liability for passive owners). See generally Erika C. Birg,
Comment, Redefining "Owner or Operator" Under CERCLA to Preserve Traditional
Notions of Corporate Law, 43 EMORY L.J. 771 (1994); Henry L. Stephens, Jr., When is
"Leaching" Not "Leaking"?: CERCLA Liability of Owners and Operators at the Time of
Disposal, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,177, 10,179 (Apr. 1994); Lisa A. Lee, Note,
Guilty for Having Done Nothing: Passive Past Owners Face CERCLA Liability, 1 Mo.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 88, 89-91 (1993). See infra note 50 and accompanying text for
brief discussion of new 1996 amendments to CERCLA offering lenders and fiduciaries
exemptions from CERCLA liability.
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contaminated industrial sites are state environmental laws. Following the
enactment of CERCLA in 1980 and widespread political support for
CERCLA and concern about hazardous waste exposure, many states enacted
mini-CERCLAs of their own.26 State mini-CERCLA statutes usually share
with the federal CERCLA law a broad liability scheme, empowering state
officials to ensure that contaminated sites are remediated.27 Some state laws
were explicitly intended to provide regulatory coverage for sites not
contaminated enough to merit federal action. 8 Other state laws largely
mirrored CERCLA.29 In some instances, parallel state coverage of
contaminated sites led to states taking the lead in addressing such sites.3"
Of at least equal significance to the creation of Brownfield sites are
industrial demographics, particularly the deindustrialization of the Northeast
and Midwest in areas that were once the industrial backbone of the United
States economy. The causes of deindustrialization extend far beyond mere
environmental liabilities. Among the leading explanations are the movement
of capital from unionized to non-union jurisdictions in the South and
26 See generally OFFICE OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE, ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA/540/8-91/002, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-
STATE STUDY, 1990 UPDATE (1990) [hereinafter EPA 50-STATE STUDY]; Elaine C. Warren,
Comment, State Hazardous Waste Superfunds and CERCLA: Conflict or Complement?, 13
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,348 (Nov. 1983). Two states had enacted CERCLA-like
statutes before Congress finalized its CERCLA statute; those statutes were also amended
subsequent to CERCLA's enactment. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE,
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA/540/8-89/011, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE
SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY 115, 150 (1989).
27 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 26, at 10,348, 10,354-56 (analyzing mini-CERCLA
liability schemes and mentioning that Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Hampshire, and New Jersey are examples of states with "express strict liability provisions").
28 See, e.g., Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., The Role of State "Little Superfunds" in Allocation
and Indemnity Actions Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 83, 84 n.3, 92 (1994).
29 See, e.g., Amy Blaymore, Retroactive Application of Superfund: Can Old Dogs Be
Taught New Tricks?, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 2 n.5 (1985) (citing ENVTL. L. INST.,
STATE SUPERFUND STATUTES 1984 (1983)).
30 See, e.g., Allen Holt Gwyn, Brownfield Initiatives and Voluntary Cleanup Programs,
CONSTRUCTION LAW., Apr. 1996, at 34, 34-35 (describing how states have taken the lead
in developing programs to encourage voluntary cleanup of contaminated sites); Robert V.
Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD.
L. REV. 1141, 1172-73 (1995) [hereinafter Percival, Environmental Federalism] (citing New
Jersey's Environmental Cleanup and Responsibility Act ("ECRA"), N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
13:1K-6 to -35 (West 1992), as an example of an innovative program).
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Southwest,3 aging infrastructure,32 and the movement of available labor away
from urban industrial centers to suburban areas.33  Analysts of
deindustrialization also point to urban crime and banks' unwillingness to
finance increased investments in low-income, primarily minority,
neighborhoods.34 Reduced reliance on port or river access and railroads, in
favor of the use of container ships and truck transportation has reduced
further the dependence of industry on particular locations near coastal or river
cities.35 Finally, racial prejudice and fears have deterred industry from
remaining in or moving into older industrial neighborhoods.36
In contrast to these trends away from continued or new investment in
old industrial areas, "Greenfield" sites outside of urban centers, as well as
Greenfield sites in other states, offer potential industrial investors increased
open space, low crime rates, and the ability of industry to design new space
to exact current needs, rather than to undertake complicated efforts to retrofit
older industrial facilities.37 State and local governments in the South and
Southwest have been further adding to these primarily market and cultural
trends by enticing capital investment to their Greenfield areas with special tax
31 See, e.g., Roger W. Schmenner, Geography and the Character and Performance of
Factories, in INDUSTRY LOCATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 241,243 (Henry W. Herzog, Jr. &
Alan M. Schlottmann eds., 1991) ("Clearly the low level of unionism has been an important
ingredient in the economic development of the Sunbelt states.").
32 See, e.g., Randall W. Eberts, Some Empirical Evidence on the Linkage Between Public
Infrastructure and Local Economic Development, in INDUSTRY LOCATION AND PUBLIC
POLICY, supra note 31, at 83, 96.
" See, e.g., VICTOR R. FUCHS, CHANGES IN THE LOCATION OF MANUFACTURING IN THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 1929, 93 (Yale U. Press 1962) (explaining that the use of automobiles
played a role in this shift because "factories formerly found it necessary to locate in heavily
populated localities or near public transit lines").
" See, e.g., Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty Law, Poverty, and America's
Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757 (1993); Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place:
The Relation Between Architectural Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, &
Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699 (1993).
" See Karen P. Lane, Studies Buoy New Hopes for Brooklyn's Waterfront, CRAINS N.Y.
BUS., Sept. 2, 1996, at 22 (discussing impacts of containerized ships on older ports like
Brooklyn, New York, and need for new infrastructure investments to attract shipping
businesses).
36 See Gregory Squires, "Runaway Plants, " Capital Mobility, and Black Economic Rights,
in COMMUNITY AND CAPITAL IN CONFLICT: PLANT CLOSINGS AND JOB Loss 62-97 (John C.
Raines et al. eds., 1982).
" See, e.g., FUCHS, supra note 33, at 91-93.
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C. Current Brownfields Programs and Policies: Carrots and Sticks
Federal, state, and local governments have implemented and are
considering a wide variety of initiatives to encourage Brownfields
reclamation and reuse. Few of these efforts under relevant statutory authority
have their roots in statutory schemes calling for "cooperative federalism," as
do most other major federal environmental statutes such as the CAA or Clean
Water Act ("CWA").39 As discussed in greater depth below, under
cooperative federalism schemes the federal government sets a basic target or
requirement and, with varying degrees of flexibility, state governments are
offered the initial opportunity to implement the schemes. Nevertheless,
although federal hazardous substance laws generally eschew such a
cooperative federalism approach, federal-state cooperation continues to
increase in an area of previously independent or parallel regulatory activity.
As discussed above, federal hazardous substance laws create a
situation of massive potential liability for anyone involved with or owning
or operating a contaminated industrial site. CERCLA, as well as analogous
state mini-CERCLAs, have been criticized for the breadth of their statutory
liabilities, their contribution to industrial closures, and the huge costs of
battling over and eventually cleaning up contaminated sites." Although
CERCLA creates categories of PRPs, ownership or pollution of a
contaminated site does not create immediate cleanup obligations. Risk averse
" See, e.g., Douglas P. Woodward & Norman J. Glickman, Regional and Local
Determinants of Foreign Firm Location in the United States, in INDUSTRY LOCATION AND
PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 31, at 190, 199. ("Much of the discussion about the movement
of jobs to the Sunbelt has centered around the congenial business climate of southern and
western states."); Vicki Been, "Exit" As a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 512-15 (1991)
[hereinafter Been, "Exit"] (discussing interjurisdictional battles to attract or retain capital
investment); see also Thomas J. Lueck, Lower Budgets Don't Cut Flow of Tax Breaks:
Businesses Get Millions to Stay in New York, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1995, at Al (reporting
economic enticement offered by governments to businesses, but also reporting new
questioning of efficacy of such efforts in context of governmental budget cuts).
" See infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text (discussing components of "cooperative
federalism" schemes).
0 See, e.g., Mark K. Dowd, New Jersey's Reform of Contaminated Site Remediation, 18
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 207, 210 (1993).
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owners and investors, however, fear potentially costly cleanup obligations.
I will refer to a PRP who desires to cleanup a contaminated site without a
preceding government order to do so as a cleanup volunteer. The difficulty
confronted by a PRP seeking to extricate itself from liability has led to further
criticism.4 If cleanup volunteers could obtain feedback and greater finality
and repose, volunteers could make informed market decisions and would not
face potentially disastrous cleanup obligations.42 Although I and other
commentators have called for the creation of a federal voluntary cleanup
approval process (which I have in the past and here will refer to as a Cleanup
Approval Process, or "CAP"), no amendment to CERCLA, RCRA, or
regulatory programs created pursuant to those statutes has yet created a
federal CAP scheme.43 Late efforts in the 104th Congress to pass a
freestanding Brownfields-targeted CERCLA reform bill failed in the press of
election year politics.44
Following failed efforts in the early to mid-1990s to amend
CERCLA, EPA responded to demands for CERCLA program changes by
issuing the Brownfields Action Agenda, also referred to as the Brownfields
Redevelopment Initiative.45  This initiative involves several interrelated
programmatic efforts.
" See, e.g., OTA, STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 1, at 1-4, 8 (stating that uncertain
liabilities hinder use and redevelopment of former industrial sites); Frederick W. Addison,
III, Reopener Liability Under Section 122 of CERCLA: "From Here to Eternity, "45 Sw.
L.J. 1081, 1086-97 (1991) (discussing how EPA settlement policy creates eternal liability).
42 See Buzbee, Remembering Repose, supra note 1, at 96.
4 See, e.g., id. at 41; Don R. Clay, It's Time to Consider Voluntary Cleanups, ENVTL. F.,
Nov./Dec. 1992, at 28.
44 The leading, but unsuccessful, bill was S. 2028, sponsored by Senators Lautenberg,
Baucus, Reid, Graham, and Moynihan. S. 2028, 104th Cong. (1996).
" See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials of
the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Timothy Fields, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. EPA)
[hereinafter Statement of Timothy Fields, Jr.]. "EPA's Brownfield Economic
Redevelopment Initiative is designed to ... encourage economic redevelopment through
environmental cleanup . . . [B]rownfields have been shunned by new industry and
prospective developers who are understandably afraid they might inherit expensive cleanup
liabilities for contamination they did not create." Id.; see also Office of Emergency and
Remedial Response, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, The Brownfields Action Agenda (visited
Jan. 30, 1997) <http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/ascii/action.txt>; see also Announcement
of Competition for Final Five Brownfield Economic Redevelopment Initiative Pilots, 59
Fed. Reg. 60,012 (1994).
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Investors and banks interested in financing new Brownfield
acquisitions successfully sought more explicit protection for prospective
purchasers and investors in contaminated property.4 In response, EPA
amended its "prospective purchaser" policy to provide prospective purchasers
with heightened protection from liability for site contamination. 47 Banks
reluctant to lend to investors in Brownfield, and even active industrial, sites
also succeeded in persuading EPA to issue a favorable regulation protecting
banks involved in contaminated sites.48  That regulation, however, was
invalidated on the ground that EPA lacked authority to issue regulations
further clarifying the contours of the statutory definition of liable PRPs. 49 By
a recent little-noticed statutory amendment to CERCLA, appended as a rider
to an appropriations bill, lenders and several categories of previously
vulnerable PRPs are given new or at least more explicit exemptions from
CERCLA liabilities.50
46 In 1995, the EPA changed its policy for inclusion of many sites on the CERCLA
Information System ("CERCLIS"), in response to "numerous oral and written comments...
from property owners, the housing and banking industry, prospective purchasers of
CERCLIS properties, and the general public indicating that there is an apparent yet
unintended stigma attached to sites in CERCLIS." 60 Fed. Reg. 16,054 (1995).
41 See William Keener, Brownfields: The United States EPA 's Policy and Legal Response,
LAND USE & ENV'T F., Summer 1995, at 146 (citing Guidance on Agreements with
Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792 (1995)). EPA will
provide "qualif~ying]" prospective purchasers covenants not to sue for "existing
contamination." 60 Fed Reg. 34,792 (superseding EPA Prospective Purchaser Policy, 54
Fed. Reg. 34,235 (1989)).
" See Edward B. Sears & Laurie P. Sears, Liability Under CERCLA, Uncertain Times for
Lenders, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,320, 10320 & n.1 (June 1994) (citing National
Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan: Lender Liability Under
CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. §§ 300-300.920
(1996))).
41 See Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 100 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that Congress gave courts,
not the EPA, authority under CERCLA § 107 to interpret questions of liability).
"o Although courts of appeals differed on when banks could be held liable despite a
presumptive "secured creditor exemption" under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20), that legal
uncertainty for banks has been greatly reduced by amendments to CERCLA passed on
September 30, 1996, as a rider to the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. This rider, entitled the Asset Conservation, Lender
Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996, also provides new protections for
fiduciaries and involuntary governnimrntholders of contaminated property. Id. subtit. E. For
a preliminary assessment of the new amendments' implications, see William W. Buzbee,
CERCLA 's New Safe Harbors for Banks, Lenders, and Fiduciaries, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
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In a recent guidance document, EPA further clarified that real
property owners will not be pursued as PRPs where contamination from
another site flows under a neighboring parcel of land.5" EPA also removed
many sites from its list of potential priority cleanup sites and designated them
as "No Further Remedial Action Planned" sites, thereby greatly reducing
perceptions of associated liability risks.5 2 EPA also has provided modest
federal funds for Brownfields redevelopment efforts in the form of direct
grants to cities with Brownfields redevelopment plans.53
During the last several years, numerous states either have amended
their mini-CERCLA laws to address industry criticisms or enacted new
voluntary cleanup approval schemes whereby a cleanup volunteer receives
government guidance about cleanup and, at the end of a successful cleanup,
receives varying degrees of reassurance that liability is terminated.5 4 State
voluntary cleanup approval initiatives continue to be enacted across the
country.5 Approvals of cleanups under state law cannot at this time bind or
preclude further cleanup pursuant to federal laws and authority.56 Federal
officials, however, generally are reluctant to devote administrative and
L. Inst.) 10,656 (Dec. 1996).
51 See Keener, supra note 47, at 145 (stating EPA does not anticipate suing owners of
property to which subsurface ground water contamination has migrated) (citing Final Policy
Toward Owners of Property Containing Contaminated Aquifers, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,790
(1995), covering owners of all types of commercial property).
5 See 60 Fed. Reg. 16,053, 16,054 (1995) (codified as an amendment to the National Oil
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan at 40 C.F.R. pt 300 (1996)).
" See Statement of Timothy Fields, Jr., supra note 45, at 14-15 (initiating $200,000 in
Brownfields pilot grants with plans for 50 such sites).
' See, e.g., Anne Slaughter Andrew, Brownfield Redevelopment: A State-Led Reform of
Superfund Liability, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1996, at 29; James T. O'Reilly,
Environmental Racism, Site Cleanup and Inner-City Jobs: Indiana's Urban In-Fill
Incentives, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 43, 58 (1994); see also Buzbee, Remembering Repose, supra
note 1, at 118-22 (summarizing in table the status of state voluntary cleanup initiatives).
5 See generally Geltman, supra note 1, at 3, 8 (providing more recent table showing state
efforts to encourage the reuse and redevelopment of contaminated industrial property
through Brownfields restoration and voluntary cleanup legislation).
56 See, e.g., Andrew, supra note 54, at 29 ("[States with voluntary cleanup programs]
cannot give comfort to lenders about federal CERCLA liability, [however midwestern states]
have responded to this crisis by adopting laws or rules that give greater comfort to lenders
regarding the potential threat of environmental liability under their respective state
Superfund programs."); O'Reilly, supra note 54, at 58 ("[S]tates cannot prevent federal
authorities from bringing suit against owners of polluted sites.").
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cleanup resources to sites already subjected to state scrutiny. This federal
forbearance is explained both by fiscal moderation and concerns for federal-
state comity.57
Several of EPA's regional offices recently entered into agreements
with state authorities setting forth EPA's willingness to give states primacy
and potentially final authority over contamination cleanups. 8 A draft central
office EPA guidance document would have allowed state settlements with
PRPs to preclude further federal intervention at remediated sites. 9 This
guidance has been sought eagerly by the states. To the dismay of interested
states and industry, EPA now appears likely to preserve a potential federal
right to revisit state-supervised cleanups under state voluntary cleanup
schemes.6" Even without such express federal relinquishment of potential
statutory authority, state voluntary cleanup approvals reduce the threat of
parallel federal and state contamination liabilities and provide investors or
property owners with greater repose and investment security than would a
cleanup lacking any government guidance. Additional analysis of the
purposes and impacts of these alternating state and federal innovations is
discussed below in Part III.
Additional proposals under consideration and likely to become law
5 See, e.g., Andrew, supra note 54, at 30 (discussing state cleanup schemes and federal
official acknowledgment of need to avoid impediments to cleanup resulting from federal
liability risks); O'Reilly, supra note 54; Telephone Interview with Douglas Stewart, Bureau
Chief of ISRA Program, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (Feb. 10,
1995) (discussing general assumption that federal intervention is less likely if state oversees
cleanups).
" See, e.g., Andrew, supra note 54, at 30 (mentioning that EPA Region V has entered into
Memoranda of Agreement with states such as Illinois and Minnesota); Region VI, Texas Sign
Agreement on Voluntary Cleanups, INSIDE EPA's RCRA REP., May 3, 1996, at 7 (discussing
agreement between Region VI of EPA and Texas prohibiting EPA interference in state-
approved cleanups); Carey S. Rosemarin & Christina M. Riewer, Taking a Clean Look at
Purchasing Contaminated Property, CHI. LAW., July 1996, at 53 (reporting similar April
1995 EPA-Illinois agreement).
'9 See EPA Drops Liability Releases in Draft Voluntary Cleanup Guidance, INSIDE EPA'S
ENVTL. POL'Y ALERT, Aug. 28, 1996, at 11 (reporting that EPA "backed off' policy that
would have allowed states to exempt parties from Superfund liability and further reporting




soon are tax deductions and possibly even tax credits for cleanup costs.6
Utilization of credits or deductions would displace current tax policy which
treats cleanup expenses as capital investments and, therefore, at most, offers
potential future tax benefits in the form of reduced taxes upon a taxable
disposition of remediated industrial property.62 A credit, in contrast, would
constitute a direct dollar for dollar reduction in federal tax obligations and
thus would, in effect, subsidize cleanup activities from revenues that would
otherwise be available for other federal appropriations.63
Another state and federal innovation possibly increasing incentives
to use Brownfield sites is the modification of cleanup obligations in light of
anticipated future uses of such sites.64 Future uses that will lead to few
exposure pathways may lead to lesser levels of cleanups, while future uses
that could lead to widespread environmental risks lead to requirements of
more costly cleanups.65 Under current federal law, however, modification of
cleanup obligations in light of anticipated future uses is of questionable
61 See, e.g., Brownfields Tax Bill Near, SUPERFUND WK., May 17, 1996, at 1 (quoting
Senator Carol Moseley-Braun's explanation that a Brownfields tax incentive bill she
introduced would help companies absorb the costs of restoring Brownfields because the
environmental cleanup costs would be deductible in the same year that the costs were
incurred), Clinton Pushes Brownfields Tax Incentive, SUPERFUND WK., Mar. 15, 1996, at 1,
8 (reporting President Clinton's proposed tax deductions for cleanup costs).
62 See, e.g., Brownfields Tax Bill Near, supra note 61, at 1 (stating that under the current
law, costs are capitalized and deductions can be taken only by companies who contaminated
the site, not by purchasers).
63 See Yoseph Edrey & Howard Abrams, Equitable Implementation of Tax Expenditures,
9 VA. TAX REV. 109, 110, 115 (1989) (discussing tax credits and other forms of tax relief
and stating that government subsidization of activities through tax relief defeats
progressivity goals of current tax structures and is "undemocratic if not immoral").
64 See James W. Creenan & John Q. Lewis, Comment, Pennsylvania's Land Recycling
Program: Solving the Brownfields Problem with Remediation Standards and Limited
Liability, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 661, 674-77 (1996) (discussing Pennsylvania's Land Recycling
and Environmental Remediation Standards Act); see also Richard A. Wegman & Harold G.
Bailey, Jr., The Challenge of Cleaning up Military .Wastes When U.S. Bases Are Closed, 21
ECOLOGY L.Q. 865, 891-93 (1994) (discussing the 103d Congress' consideration of
Superfund Reform Act bill).
61 See generally Krista J. Ayers, Comment The Potential for Future Use Analysis in
Superfund Remediation Programs, 44 EMORY L.J. 1503 (1995).
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legality.66
Complicating Brownfields diagnoses and prescriptions are conflicting
views within the environmental "justice," "equity," or "racism" movement.
This relatively new movement is built upon the observation that the brunt of
industrialization's ills are borne most often by the poor, and particularly the
minority poor.67 Much of the environmental justice literature focuses on the
siting of noxious facilities like hazardous waste burning or disposal facilities,
while other studies look at the configuration of industrial facilities and the
demographics of surrounding residential populations.68 Some analysts
identifying themselves as proponents of environmental justice call for more
equal dispersion of industrial burdens, which necessarily would call for
' See id. at 1506-07, 1514-16. Recent CERCLA amendment proposals sought to further
sanction varying cleanup levels in light of future uses but were defeated as part of the
general defeat of CERCLA amendment and reauthorization legislation in 1993 and 1994.
See id. at 1519-22 (discussing recent CERCLA amendment proposals' impact on future use
analysis); see also, e.g., 140 CONG. REc. E602-01, E603 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994) (statement
of Rep. Zellif) (introducing the Comprehensive Superfund Improvement Act of 1994). See
also Wegman & Bailey, supra note 64, at 893 (discussing 103d Congress' consideration of
SRA). Several leading proposals of the 104th Congress to reform regulation through
enactment of a single statute imposing on agencies new cost-benefit and risk analysis
obligations also contained a provision seeking to allow lesser levels of cleanups based on
less conservative (or protective) assumptions of risk. See S. 343, as set forth in S. REP. No.
104-90, app. § 631 (1995); see also William W. Buzbee, Regulatory Reform or Statutory
Muddle: The "Legislative Mirage" of Single Statute Regulatory Reform, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 298, 339 (1996) [hereinafter Buzbee, Regulatory Reform] (discussing proposed risk
assessment provisions and citing sections of reform bills that would have impacted CERCLA
cleanup obligations). This provision regarding CERCLA cleanups died along with other
leading regulatory reform proposals in late 1995.
67 See, e.g., ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990); Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It?
Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 6 CORNELL L. REV.
1001 (1994); Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David's
Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523 (1994).
68 Compare Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice ": The Distributional
Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787 (1993), and Paul Mohai &
Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and Class as Factors in the
Distribution of Environmental Hazards, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 921 (1992), with Vicki Been,
Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods. Disproportionate Siting or
Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383 (1994), and O'Reilly, supra note 54, at 45.
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reduced reliance on concentrated clusters of industry.69 Any such attempts
to disperse the burdens of industry more equitably might contribute to the
creation of Brownfield sites. Other analysts of environmental justice issues
seek to balance concerns about residual environmental risks with efforts to
retain industrial neighborhood employment. 7' Nevertheless, despite tensions
in these goals, environmental justice advocates share the widespread goal of
contaminated site cleanups. 71
The ills associated with abandonment of Brownfield sites thus cannot
be attributed to any one cause. The particular constellation of market forces,
demographic shifts, cultural bias and prejudice, state and local efforts to
attract industry, as well as fears of potential federal environmental liabilities,
all add up to strong incentives to avoid investments in Brownfield sites.
Initially parallel, but increasingly coordinated, state and federal efforts are
underway to address the lost potential and ills associated with Brownfield
sites.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM AND BROWNFIELDS POLICIES
This section briefly sketches out the basics of federalism law and
logic, illuminating each common explanation or critique of federalism
principles with reference to environmental law developments and
Brownfields policies. This section sets the stage for discussion in Part III of
an alternative explanation for the development of federal and state hazardous
69 See, e.g., Deeohn Ferris, A Challenge to EPA. An Environmental Justice Office Is
Needed, EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1992, at 28 ("The keystone of this quest for justice is equal
protection, not equal pollution.").
70 See Christopher Boerner & Thomas Lambert, Environmental Injustice, PUB. INTEREST,
Jan. 1, 1995, at 61 (providing an example of the NAACP supporting a company's plan to
build an incinerator and landfill in minority community because of the economic benefits
the company promised to bring to the community); Fred Kalmbach, Jackson Says US. Firms
Poison Poor, BATON ROUGE ST. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1990, at 1A ("John O'Connor, head of the
National Toxics Campaign, said the quest for a safe environment should not deny minorities
and the poor the jobs they desperately need.").
" See, e.g., Rita Beamish, Gore is Told of Pollution Woes for Poor, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
3, 1993, at 11 (reporting statement of an urban pastor to Vice President Al Gore about
interest in Brownfields rehabilitation and investment, but "only if the economic growth and
trade enhances human life and does not destroy human life").
1997]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
waste laws, Brownfields policies, and environmental laws in general. 72
By federalism, I refer generally to a system of governance with a
central government authority and regional governments with at least some
areas of policymaking autonomy.73 Under our Constitution, and for purposes
of this article, federalism refers to a legal system recognizing the United
States federal government and state governments as entities with areas of
autonomous political authority and areas of overlapping or delegated
authority.
A substantial amount of federalism scholarship analyzes issues of
"constitutional federalism." This body of scholarship and case law primarily
addresses the limits of federal and state authority under the United States
Constitution.74 Constitutional federalism scholarship and cases address issues
such as state restrictions on interstate commerce and the dormant Commerce
Clause, or federal intervention in areas of local concern without the requisite
showing of Commerce Clause authority or other bases for federal action.
Paradigmatic cases falling into this latter category are the Supreme Court's
recent United States v. Lopez and New York v. United States opinions, both
of which found constitutionally untenable assertions of federal authority.75
72 This alternative approach developed infra Part III applies the logic of "first-mover"
market dynamics to the setting of entrepreneurial environmental politics to shed new light
on the history of environmental and Brownfields policy, particularly focusing on federal and
state environmental activism.
" See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feely, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 910-11 (1994) (stating that "[f]ederalism is not a
managerial decision by the central decision-maker, as decentralization can be, but a
structuring principle for the system as a whole," and that in this system, "subordinate units
possess prescribed areas of jurisdiction that cannot be invaded by the central authority"); see
also William Ty Mayton, The Fate of Lesser Voices: Calhoun v. Wechsler on Federalism
1 (Oct. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the William & Mary Environmental Law
& Policy Review) (stating that "federalism denotes, and implies a respect for, the sovereignty
of the states.").
74 See, e.g., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM: EUROPE AND AMERICA (Mark
Tushnet ed., 1990); Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress
Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law? 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1995).
"' United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (declaring the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990 an unconstitutional exercise of Commerce Clause power because Congress
failed to establish a connection between interstate commerce and gun possession); New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding the "take-title" provision of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act unconstitutional because the provision forced
states to administer a federal program). See infra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing
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As shown below, little in hazardous waste law or Brownfields policy
implicates issues of constitutional federalism.
Another body of federalism literature posits that although federal
activity may be authorized, our constitutional structure reflects a value
preference for state authority as the norm, with only limited federal
government.76 I will characterize this school of federalism as "normative
federalism."" Normative federalism's general preference for state primacy
is rooted in constitutional language and structure, but seldom mandates a
particular result.78 Instead, advocates of such a concept of federalism add
state primacy values as a weight to be considered in developing law and
policy.
A third major category of federalism looks at questions of state and
federal authority through an instrumental perspective. Under this
"instrumental federalism" prism, the issue is generally one of comparative
institutional competence-how should authority be divided between state and
federal authorities to achieve particular goals.79 Instrumental federalism
judgment calls may be influenced by the extent to which one sees normative
federalism as a heavy or light weight on the scale of appropriate policy
options.
interjurisdictional competition for business investment and citing recent articles discussing
dormant Commerce Clause issues raised by tax incentives to entice investment).
76 See Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court
Dialogue, 42 DUKE L.J. 979 (1993); Rubin & Feely, supra note 73, at 914 n.50 ("A
justification for federalism is normative.... if it views federalism (that is, the autonomy of
states to choose their own political norms) as inherently desirable.").
" See Althouse, supra note 76, at 980.
78 Professor Merritt's approach to federalism, which relies upon.constitutional language,
structure, and goals to derive arguments for judicial protection of state sovereignty, could
be characterized as adopting a "normative federalism" approach. See, e.g., Deborah Jones
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988). In her critique of the Lopez decision, which in turn responded to
another professor's article, Professor Merritt acknowledges that the Commerce Clause "does
not yield a single, fixed answer," but she continues by articulating "guideposts" for
Commerce Clause disputes. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 685, 689 (1996).
71 See John Denvir, Justice Rehnquist and Constitutional Interpretation, 34 HASTINGS L.J.
1011, 1039 (1983) (stating that "federalism has usually been an 'instrumental' value; one's
view of federalism has been linked to some larger substantive issue"); Rubin & Feely, supra
note 73, at 914 n.50 (explaining that "a justification for federalism is instrumental if it views
federalism as a means to some independent end, such as citizen participation").
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Among the virtues of federalism identified by instrumental federalism
and, to a lesser extent, normative federalism analyses are responsiveness
offered by decentralized law implementation by state authorities" and
economies of scale in the form of federal information gathering or
technological or scientific expertise benefitting many states.' An additional
benefit of a federal system is the existence of diverse state legal schemes
offering citizens with diverse preferences the ability to choose their preferred
jurisdiction for home or business.8 2  Diversity of autonomous political
institutions is also more likely to allow for innovation than would a single
80 See David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal
System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United
States, the States, and Their Citizens? 54 MD. L. REv. 1552, 1571 (1995) ("Strong state
enforcement programs are invaluable within a federal system. A strong state can respond
more rapidly to local pollution problems than can the federal government."); David Schnapf,
State Hazardous Waste Programs Under the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 12 ENVTL. L. 679, 737 (1982) ("State agencies tend to be more responsive to their
citizens, act faster, and are more flexible in fashioning pragmatic solutions to problems.");
Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210 (1977)
[hereinafter Stewart, Pyramids] (discussing rationale for decentralized implementation). But
see Rubin & Feely, supra note 73, at 924-25 (contending that an argument for the benefits
of decentralization is not one for federalism since a federalist system preserves state
policymaking autonomy).
81 See, e.g., States Express Concern over EPA 's Limited Funding, INSIDE EPA, Feb. 2,
1996, at 13 ("State sources also claim that many research projects would be virtually
impossible to continue without sustained support and technical assistance from E.P.A.").
8" See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative
Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 745 (1995). The idea that
a federalist system with diverse and autonomous states would offer citizens greater ability
to choose a preferred mix of regulatory amenities than would a federally-mandated scheme
of regulation was initially developed in the world of scholarship by Charles M. Tiebout, A
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). See also Richard L.
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom"
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1236-39 (1992)
(critiquing Tiebout and discussing scholarship further developing the Tiebout analysis). But
see infra notes 84-85 (citing to studies of corporate charter interjurisdictional competition
resulting in substantial uniformity of politically autonomous but competing states).
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unified political unit. In contrast to the thesis that autonomous states will
offer a diversity of legal regimes, some scholars posit that state versus state
regulatory competition for business, often referred to as "competitive
federalism," may lead to reduced opportunities for "special interest" skewing
of state laws than if such regulatory competition was prohibited. 4 The end
result of this competition is not a diversity of legal schemes but legal schemes
sharing similar attributes.
Within this "instrumental federalism" camp, one of the most prevalent
explanations for federal intervention in the area of environmental law is to
prevent competitive federalism from causing a "race-to-the-bottom" among
the states that would be destructive to attempts to protect citizen safety,
health, and the environment. Under this theory, which recently has been
questioned. by Professor Revesz,86 were the federal government not to enact
a uniform goal or standard for the states, the states would compete for
business and capital by offering more business-friendly and less consumer-
or environment-protective regulatory schemes than would otherwise be
" The idea that preserving areas of state autonomy would offer opportunities for diversity
and innovation was best expressed by Justice Brandeis: "It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.
dissenting). The supposition that states will, in reality, innovate in ways leading to a
diversity of state legal schemes has been questioned. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk-
Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593
(1980). But see WILLIAM R. LOWRY, THE DIMENSIONS OF FEDERALISM: STATE
GOVERNMENTS AND POLLUTION CONTROL POLICIES (1992) (analyzing state pollution control
policies and discussing contexts in which states have acted as innovators or leaders in
pollution control strategies); DAVID L. SCHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 85-86 (1995)
(discussing Rose-Ackerman's argument but asserting that despite "the force of these points,
it seems clear that [thousands of] state and local government units ... are more likely to
engage in experiments than one national unit").
" See, e.g., William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate
Charters, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 153 (forthcoming 1997) [hereinafter Carney, Political Economy].
" See William J. Carney, Federalism and Corporate Law. A Non-Delaware View of the
Results of Competition, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION
(Joseph McCary & William Bratton eds., 1997); see also Joel R. Paul, Free Trade,
Regulatory Competition and the Autonomous Market Fallacy, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29
(1994/95) (discussing European Union regulatory dynamics, "race-to-the-bottom" theories,
and how economic integration has been accompanied by a rise in packaging waste
regulations).
86 See Revesz, supra note 82.
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sought by state citizens and officials.87 Indeed, one finds substantial
documentation of interjurisdictional competition to retain or attract new
business.88 The risks of state officials neglecting environmental concerns
may be particularly high in the setting of individualized negotiations about
the degree of cleanup required at a contaminated site, especially if a state is
in fiscal straits.89
Hazardous waste and Brownfields issues concededly have a
substantially local flavor in their immediate impacts.9" Nevertheless,
collectively, the interstate nature of hazardous waste businesses, interstate
commercial impacts of polluting industries, occasional interstate pollution
impacts, and interjurisdictional competition for businesses possibly involved
in abandoning, buying, or remediating contaminated sites, easily justify under
87 See Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 80, at 1212. Although Professor Revesz has called
the sufficiency of this rationale into question, the extent to which his critique makes sense
in the context of adjudicatory (or individualized) decisions rather than legislative or
regulatory decisions requires further analysis. See Buzbee, Remembering Repose, supra note
1, at 110-16; see also Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good
Fortune, 54 MD. L. REv. 1516, 1533 (1995) ("Professor Revesz's analysis may demonstrate
limitations of 'the theoretical literature on interjurisdictional competition,' but it does not
call into serious question the need for federal standards to provide a minimum level of
environmental protection to all U.S. residents."). Furthermore, as Professor Lowry has
shown in his study of state pollution control policies, a number of variables may make states
more vulnerable to capital migration threats; among those variables are the degree of federal
intervention, the medium regulated and various other aspects of state political structures and
finances. See LOWRY, supra note 83, at ch. 1.
88 See, e.g., Been, "Exit," supra note 38, at 512-15 (citing and discussing news and
scholarly articles regarding interjurisdictional competition for business); see also Lueck,
supra note 38 (discussing state and municipal efforts to attract business and reduced
willingness to offer concessions to businesses). Two recent articles analyze
interjurisdictional competition for new businesses, the use of tax incentives to attract
investment, and implications of such state incentives under dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REv. 378, 382-405 (1996);
Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business
Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789, 790-92 (1996).
89 See LOWRY, supra note 83, at 8, 40-41; Buzbee, Remembering Repose, supra note 1,
at 114-15.
9 See, e.g., Adam Babich, Circumventing Environmental Laws: Does the Sovereign Have
a License to Pollute, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1991, at 28; Sean D. Murphy,
Prospective Liability Regimes for the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, 88




the Constitution a federal role in addressing hazardous waste and Brownfields
issues." Brownfields issues present an area of concurrent federal and state
authority, with instrumental and normative federalism views influencing
one's choice of legal and regulatory policy.
Many other federal environmental laws fall into the "instrumental
federalism" category and adopt a "cooperative federalism" approach.92 Under
cooperative environmental federalism schemes, federal laws set goals and
federal authorities provide states with technological and scientific data and
oversee state or local government implementation decisions. Part of the
rationale for such cooperative federalism schemes is simple comparative
institutional expertise.93 Under such schemes, the degree of local
enforcement discretion and autonomy varies in different sections of the
federal environmental statutes. Many praise the cooperative federalism
instituted in the CAA and the CWA as an effective sharing of authority,
capitalizing on the best capabilities of federal and state officials and
preventing destructive races to the regulatory bottom.94 Under most
cooperative federalism schemes, states have a substantial role in tailoring
federal requirements to the varying needs of state and local jurisdictions.
Critics decry the predominant role of federal authorities as unduly
bureaucratic and insensitive to the needs and political preferences of state and
local populations.95
As Professors Dwyer and Stewart have explained, these cooperative
schemes may be inevitable; federal authorities simply could not do it all
themselves, but are necessarily dependent on state partners to achieve
"' See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U.PA. L. REv. 2341 (1996) (analyzing interstate pollution as a rationale for federal
intervention). But see United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996)(reasoning that mercury contamination on land used by Olin was purely local, did not
constitute "economic activity," and did not have a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce, and holding application of CERCLA liability under these facts an
unconstitutional exercise of Commerce Clause power).
92 See Percival, Environmental Federalism, supra note 30, at 1174.
13 See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L.REv. 1183, 1224 (1995) [hereinafter Dwyer, Practice]; Percival, Environmental Federalism,
supra note 30, at 1174.
9 See Dwyer, Practice, supra note 93, at 1217-18, 1223-25.
9 See Hornstein, supra note 12, at 374-75 (discussing the criticisms of the "overly rigid
bureaucratic commands" in environmental statutes of early 1970s and noting only "modest"
changes to allow greater flexibility in subsequent amendments).
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environmental protection.96 Federal oversight of state efforts perhaps fosters
greater state diligence and may reduce the risks of "capture" of state
authorities by those with concentrated interests in a particular issue.97
CERCLA and the Brownfields story are not, as with other major
federal statutes such as the CAA and the CWA, rooted in a cooperative
federalism scheme dictated by statute.98 Instead, as shown previously in Part
I, much of the story of hazardous substance regulation shows a different
dynamic, with federal, then state, authorities showing leadership in devising
strategies to attack and remedy problems associated with contaminated
sites.99 In this area, one finds a history of copycat legislation, alternating
innovations, and generally parallel legal coverage.'00 The realities of state
enforcement of parallel state laws has created what might be called "bottom-
up" federalism, leading to a defacto cooperative enforcement scheme even
in the absence of explicit statutory or regulatory mandates to states to
establish such a scheme.
The dynamic at play here is a vertical federal-state variant on what is
often labeled "competitive federalism" in the context of state versus state
competition. Considerable activism of both federal and state governments is
especially notable in the history of environmental federalism. Under much
of the literature analyzing political and regulatory dynamics, one would not
expect to find laws or regulations on the books that harm concentrated
interests to the benefit of dispersed interests. Part III analyzes the substance
96 Dwyer, Practice, supra note 93, at 1217-18, 1223-25; Stewart, Pyramids, supra note
80, at 1201; see also Robert R. Kuehn, The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal
Environmental Laws, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2373, 2384-85 (1996) (arguing for an ongoing federal
role, but observing increased state resources and commitment to assume enforcement of
federal laws).
97 See LOWRY, supra note 83, at 50 (quoting a state official's statement that state officials
"don't mind having the 'federal gorilla in the closet,' which can be turned loose if polluters
object too much"). For further discussion of the elements of "capture" theories of
regulation, see infra note 101 and accompanying text.
98 See, e.g., Percival, Environmental Federalism, supra note 30, at 1160-63; see also
Babich, Our Federalism, supra note 87, at 1534-37 (discussing possibility under CERCLA
of federal-state "cooperative agreements" under CERCLA § 104, but reporting minimal use
of such a cooperative federalism option).
99 See infra Part III.
" Some aspects of CERCLA actually show an inverted federalism scheme, with federal
officials making some decisions with reference to state legal standards. See Babich, Our
Federalism, supra note 87, at 1535-37.
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and timing of federal and state environmental activism, particularly
examining interrelationships between federal and state actions. After
analyzing the dynamics and incentives underlying state and federal actions,
Part III offers suggestions for why Brownfields initiatives have struck a
responsive political chord and analyzes how best to implement efficacious
Brownfields rehabilitation efforts.
III. VERTICAL COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM AND THE FIRST-MOVER STORY
Under the logic of classic "capture" theories of regulation and
legislation, rigorous environmental laws should be a rarity, especially at the
state level.1' Some portions of environmental laws are consistent with
101 "Capture" theories have their roots in the observation that elected politicians or
regulators are likely to be disproportionally contacted and influenced by entities with
concentrated interests in an issue, thereby skewing the law or regulation in their favor. See
NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 56 (1994) (discussing "capture theory" and pointing out
that it is also referred to as special interest theory, interest group theory, or what Komesar
prefers to call "minoritarian bias"). Regulated entities are expected to achieve this
disproportionate influence over officials because they likely will be fewer in number and
hence have lower costs of acting collectively, and greater monetary interests at stake, than
will the usually more dispersed beneficiaries of a political initiative. See id. See generally
MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS (1965) (discussing costs of collective action and disparate impacts of political
and economic choices on concentrated groups and the public). See also Edward L. Rubin,
Institutional Analysis and the New Legal Process, 1995 WISC. L. REV. 463, 466 (1995)
[hereinafter Rubin, Institutional Analysis] (reviewing Komesar's book, supra, and observing
that the effectiveness of market, legal, and political institutions "will tend to vary in similar
directions as a result of similar phenomena ... [tending] to be responsive to small, well-
organized groups with high stakes in a given issue, and to undervalue interests that are
widely and shallowly dispersed"). The anticipated result is laws and regulations skewed to
benefit concentrated interests to the detriment of the dispersed public. See Daniel A. Farber,
Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 60-61 (1992)
[hereinafter Farber, Politics and Procedure] (applying insights to disparity in impacts of
environmental laws on regulated entities and dispersed beneficiaries but exploring why,
despite this disparity, current environmental laws impose substantial burdens on those
regulated); see also KOMESAR, supra, at 54-58 (discussing theories and literature concerning
capture); Daniel A. Farber, Positive Theory as Normative Critique, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1565,
1567 (1995) [hereinafter Farber, Positive Theory] (exploring how past scholars inadequately
have considered the political characteristics of government institutions in the United States
and defining "positive political theory" as grounded in the "basic assumption ... that
individuals act rationally and strategically, selecting the most effective means to achieve
1997]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
capture theories, with particular provisions of law offering an advantage to
a particular region's industry. 0 2 Taken as a whole, however, environmental
laws like the CAA, the CWA, and CERCLA impose substantial burdens on
industry despite industry's substantial financial clout and adversely impacted
interests. Far from our finding political flight from a politically risky area of
legislation and regulation, federal and state officials have engaged in a tug of
war over environmental regulatory primacy. Little in federal or state official
behavior appears predictable or constant. Each change in the political,
market, and regulatory terrain causes a shift in the political environment and
creates different political opportunities and risks.° 3
The hypothesis developed in this Part builds off of previous
scholarship which has pointed to political enterprise or entrepreneurial
activity to explain the substance of modem environmental legislation. This
section starts by examining this "political enterprise" hypothesis in the
comparative context of the history of federal and state environmental law and
policy, particularly in the hazardous substance and Brownfields areas. This
their goals"); Rubin, Institutional Analysis, supra, at 464-66 (addressing capture theories).
Under related theories of "rent seeking," those most impacted by a political
initiative use the political process to extract benefits for themselves which would be
unavailable but for a political initiative. See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General
Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971) [hereinafter Stigler,
Economic Regulation]; George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators
Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1962). For a more recent debate over
the application of such theories to the process of legislative change in the law, compare
Richard Doernberg & Fred McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing
Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987), with Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public
Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax
Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (1990). Others criticize such theories for
being overly general and failing to consider, among other aspects of political choices, the
role of ideology in American politics. See Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice:
Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 55-
57 (1991) [hereinafter Rubin, Public Choice].
"02 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN & WILLIAM HASSLER, CLEAN COAL, DIRTY AIR ch.
4 (1981) (showing how provisions of the CAA were primarily to benefit segments of coal
industry).
103 Cf William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REV. 26, 33 (1994) (analyzing recent United States Supreme Court decisions and
proposing that, as an institution, it too is "rational in taking actions that serve [its]
preferences or goals, and that, in pursuing such goals, institutional actors act in light of the
knowledge that they are interdependent") (emphasis in original).
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part adds to those previous analyses by showing how the approximate
twenty-five year period of federal environmental policy leadership is
consistent with literature analyzing "first-mover advantage" dynamics and
different electoral incentives of federal or state politicians to establish their
environmental credentials. The article then turns to analysis of abundant state
environmental activity of recent years, particularly efforts to encourage
Brownfields rehabilitation. This subsection questions whether state
eagerness to assume delegated federal statutory programs or enact
independent but parallel state regulatory schemes can be assumed to reflect
a new and independent state eagerness to protect the environment and state
citizens. Much of the recent state environmental activity appears to be
largely the result of preceding federal actions and the threat of federal
enforcement if states fail to be environmentally active. These observations
about the dynamics of environmental federalism in turn offer lessons for
Brownfields rehabilitation initiatives.
A. The First-Mover Phenomenon and Its Environmental Regulatory
Parallels
The history of federal and state environmental regulatory activity is
remarkably consistent with literature analyzing "first-mover advantages."
This literature analyzes how institutions gain advantages by being the first to
produce an innovation or new product, in this case an innovative legal and
political product in the form of new bodies of law and regulation."°4 First-
mover analysis is not distinct to environmental federalism or legal structures.
"4 For an excellent survey of literature on the dynamics of first-mover advantages, see
Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 41 (1988). See also Ian Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter
Competition: Lessons from Patents, Yachting and Bluebooks, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 541 (1995)
[hereinafter Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies] (exploring circumstances in which
interjurisdictional competition for business might fail to create "first-best efficiency");
Brown, supra note 82, at 816-18 (applying first-mover dynamics to explore legislative
incentives to be the first state to recognize same-sex marriages); Carney, Political Economy,
supra note 84, at 159-61 (exploring how despite first-mover advantages, competitive
federalism which allows for competitive forces .outside a legal system will weaken power
of interest groups to engage in "rent-seeking activities"); Roberta Romano, Law as a
Product. Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985)
(exploring how a state's speed of responsiveness in creating a demanded legal product
contributed to efforts to attract business).
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Instead, it focuses on how institutions evolve and may compete. If the
federal government's several-decade preeminence as the environmental
policymaker or enforcer is primarily, or at least in part, the result of its being
the political "first-mover," rather than the result of some inherent institutional
superiority rooted in the place of the federal government in our constitutional
structure, then reduced reliance on an ongoing predominant federal role may
be appropriate." 5 It is difficult, however, to analyze inherent superiority
versus context-specific superiority of federal environmental efforts. The
analysis below seeks to distinguish the advantage the federal government
gained as the "first-mover" in the environmental regulatory arena from less
time- or context-specific differences in the types of preferences, pressures,
and incentives felt by state or federal officials.
1. The Ebb and Flow of the Federal First-Mover Advantages
Substantial federal activity starting around the late 1960s followed
relatively passive to nonexistent state anti-pollution efforts, despite federal
grants to states and encouragement of anti-pollution efforts. 10 6 The standard
story is that the federal government, in essence, gave up on resistant or
inactive states. 7 The problem with this story, however, is that the federal
'05 In this discussion, references to federal "preeminence" or "superiority" in the context
of environmental political activism refer both to federal leadership in creating new
legislative and regulatory strategies and to the likelihood that government action will, in fact,
provide the claimed environmental benefits. Whether more stringent environmental
enforcement is, in fact, beneficial is surely debatable. Here, I seek to explore which
institutions most effectively created regulatory schemes and which institution or level of
government is likely to achieve stated goals.
'06 See Percival, Environmental Federalism, supra note 30, at 1144, 1160.
107 See, e.g., LOWRY, supra note 83, at 21 ("The increased federal role [by the late 1960s]
resulted from widespread and growing perceptions that the states simply were not doing the
job."); Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt Environmental
Standards More Stringent Than Federal Standards: Policy Considerations and Interpretive
Problems, 54 MO. L. REv. 1373, 1373 ("[Iln response to the states' inability to address
adequately [environmental degradation].. . , Congress concluded that a national system of
environmental regulation was necessary .... "); Vickie L. Patton, A Balanced Partnership,
ENVTL. F., May-June 1996, at 16, 18 ("The primary impetus for the major federal
environmental statutes was the need for a national response to states' inability to effectively
protect environmental quality."); Percival, Environmental Federalism, supra note 30, at
1144, 1160 ("[E]nvironmental law became federalized only after a long history of state
failure to protect what had come to be viewed as nationally important interests.").
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government was also quite inactive in anti-pollution efforts until the late
1960s. A more convincing story is that federal legislators, principally
Senator Muskie, either catalyzed or were prescient in foreseeing substantial
electoral support for federal environmental legislation. That same potential
electoral impetus existed throughout the nation, but the federal government
by acting first seized a long-term advantage as the preeminent environmental
policymaker.'018
Significant federal environmental activity followed the publication of
Rachel Carson's book Silent Spring, the widely covered ravages of the
pesticide DDT, and a huge petroleum well blowout off of the California
coast.10 9 These events, and the first Earth Day celebration, generally are
credited as catalyzing events that led to heightened citizen concern and
awareness about environmental degradation."' By the mid-i 970s, the federal
legislature had enacted a broad range of environmental laws changing how
polluters and regulators responded to the by-products of industrial production
and harmful land use decisions. "' Enforcement authority was concentrated
in the newly created EPA." 2  From the time of passage of major
environmental laws in the late 1960s and early 1970s, widespread public
support for environmental protection was found in environmental polls."3
That widespread public support continues today." 4
The stringent content of environmental laws is not merely the result
108 See infra note 121 and accompanying text for discussion of previous scholarship
developing an "entrepreneurial" environmental politics thesis. As discussed infra note 177
and accompanying text, the existence of a groundswell of citizen environmental awareness
does not mean that such a change in awareness would have an equal impact in federal and
state politics. Different electoral incentives and pressures from those regulated shed light
on why federal activism came first and has been so durable.
'09 See JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 20
(1995); Percival, Environmental Federalism, supra note 30, at 1157-58.
"o See Percival, Environmental Federalism, supra note 30, at 1158-59; Zygmunt J.B.
Plater, From the Beginning, a Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory and Short History
of Environmental Law, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 981, 1000-01 (1994).
. See Percival, Environmental Federalism, supra note 30, at 1159-60.
112 See MARC K. LANDY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE
WRONG QUESTIONS FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 28-33 (expanded ed. 1994); MINTZ, supra
note 109, at 20-24.
1 See MINTZ, supra note 109, at 22, 161 n.5.
14 See Buzbee, Remembering Repose, supra note 1, at 114 & n.284 (reviewing assorted
recent polls showing widespread support for environmental protection despite recent anti-
regulatory rhetoric).
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of interest group pressures. While many theorists posit that post-New Deal
agencies promulgate regulations to benefit those regulated, and not for the
public interest, federal environmental laws and regulations undoubtedly
impose substantial burdens on industry and do not easily fit this "regulatory
capture" hypothesis." 5 Moreover, state initiatives to share environmental
regulatory credit and burdens and to pass their own stringent laws enacted
during the last ten to fifteen years are also frequently hard to explain except
as the strong environmental enactments they appear to be. 6
The key insight that begins to explain this unexpected body of
environmental law is that politicians, including both legislators and
regulators, are not mere computers registering interest group pressures and
producing outcomes desired by those groups with concentrated interests in
policy.I 7 Instead, politicians have agendas and concerns of their own, which
may deviate from or lead to resistance to constituent and interest group
pressure. Nevertheless, virtually all political analysts concede that electoral
accountability influences politicians' choices." 8 Some scholars discuss this
dynamic with overtones of venality or corruption, but it need not be viewed
in such a manner. An alternative view is that sometimes democracy will
work; politicians may respond to constituent desires by advocating policies
that will marginally increase the likelihood of support in the polling booth." 9
..5 See supra note 101 (reviewing capture and related collective action theories).
116 See infra notes 180-88 and accompanying text (discussing environmental activism by
the states).
"' See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory
of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 102 (1987) (stating that politicians are "independent
actors making their own demands"); cf LOWRY, supra note 83, at 3-4 ("Policies are not
simply created by national officials and then routinely implemented by state and local
governments as if they were unquestioning automatons .... ."). A variant on this thesis is
developed in scholarship identifying itself as ground in "positive political theory." See
generally Farber, Positive Theory, supra note 101.
118 For a classic exposition of the thesis that the primary goal of legislators is reelection,
see DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974). See also Rubin,
Institutional Analysis, supra note 101, at 473-74 (discussing diverse views of impacts of
"participatory process" in democratic societies and different motivations within different
institutions).
119 Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95-96 (1985) (showing how broad delegations of
authority to agencies may not necessarily reflect politicians "passing of the buck" but instead
political responsiveness to citizen desire for more fact-based flexible implementation of
regulatory schemes). As discussed further infra note 172 and accompanying text, the
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Similarly, agency officials' accountability within executive branch
hierarchies to the President or a governor creates at least limited electoral
accountability, especially where agency officials serve at the pleasure of
those executive officials.121
Politicians' own electoral incentives go far in explaining the history
of the first significant and stringent federal environmental laws. This
nation's first modem environmental legislation, the CAA Amendments of
1970, was the result not of mere official responsiveness to popular outcry or
capitulation to industry's objections, but is more aptly characterized as the
result of political entrepreneurial or enterprising activity responding to, or
perhaps catalyzing, an incipient environmental activism among the
citizenry. 121 In particular, Senator Muskie and President Nixon engaged in
an upwardly escalating battle to claim credit as the more environmentally
sensitive politician. 2 2 At the time of this battle, the two appeared to be likely
presidential opponents in the upcoming elections. The end result was a
stringent law that, along with several other early environmental laws as
shortly thereafter amended, established the federal government, and the EPA
salience of environmental issues in voting decisions does not mean that such issues are vote-
determinative. Instead, environmental and a variety of other issues may, for voters, indicate
something about the character of the candidate. See Morning Edition, Administration
Campaigns on Environmental Record, (National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 4, 1996),
available in 1996 WL 12730090 (analyzing importance of environmental issues to voter
choices during 1996 elections but also stating that environmental issues are the key voting
issue for only 10% of voters).
120 Part of the theory behind the leading case calling for deference to agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutory language, Chevron, U.S.A. v. National Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), is rooted in just such a theory of democratic
accountability. The soundness of this rationale, particularly given the likelihood of an
executive branch official disregarding the wishes of the legislature, has been questioned. See
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452 (1989).
121 The dynamics discussed in this paragraph are drawn largely from E. Donald Elliott et
al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution. The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985), and from insights of Professor Farber, who has further built
on that work. See Farber, Politics and Procedure, supra note 101. One of the early
explorations of the "entrepreneurial politics" explanation for public interest regulation of the
1970s is James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357,
370-72 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (also discussed in Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation
in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1189, 1293-95 (1986)).
2 See LANDY ET AL., supra note 112, at 28; Elliot et al., supra note 121, at 327-29, 333-
38; Farber, Politics and Procedure, supra note 101, at 67-68.
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in particular, as the preeminent environmental policymaker in the nation. 23
This article explores federal and state environmental activism in greater depth
below in subsection 2 to suggest reasons why the federal government acted
first and why it has maintained a several decade preeminence as the protector
of the environment.
Where, as here, new laws or regulations benefit dispersed
beneficiaries to the detriment of concentrated industry confronting huge
compliance costs, a capture argument is difficult to make. Despite the
considerable role of not-for-profit environmental groups, one still finds
greatly disparate stakes in environmental regulation. 124 One cannot validly
claim that regulation at the federal (or, later, at the state level) was "captured"
by the environmentalists, because, as Professor Wiley has observed in
another context, such an approach would turn capture theory into a
tautology-whoever succeeds in the political arena has captured the
regulation. 125
Instead, for at least two decades, environmental protection efforts
became an area of largely bipartisan consensus, with inevitable disagreements
about means to environmentally protective ends, but with few politicians or
'23 See LANDY ET AL., supra note 112, at 26-33 (showing how EPA became the "nation's
preeminent designer of environmental policy").
124 Concededly, public interest environmental groups are stakeholders with a concentrated
interest in legal policies. They are frequently given explicit powers to litigate as private
attorneys general; their involvement is a source of publicity and credit-taking in the fund
raising arena; and their expertise in interpreting laws they helped draft virtually ensures
future productive work. See, e.g., Farber, Politics and Procedure, supra note 101, at 70-75;
R. Shep Melnick, Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 245, 250 & n.24
(1992). Nevertheless, their monetary stake in environmental laws is dwarfed by industry
impacts. Furthermore, ideological commitment seems a much better explanation for the
activities of these groups. Particularly for public interest lawyers, if monetary wealth were
the true goal, private sector work would surely leave them far more wealthy. Environmental
groups do, however, undoubtedly have a greater interest in environmental laws and
regulations than does the public, and may have interests in statutory structures to enhance
their ongoing role. See Farber, Politics and Procedure, supra note 101, at 73-75 (discussing
the ongoing role of environmental groups as citizen suit litigators in statutory
implementation process).




regulators willing to speak against measures to protect the environment. 126
Federal politicians confronted ongoing incentives to at least appear sensitive
to environmental concerns to satisfy electoral pressures. 127  Ideological
commitment to environmental protection further played a likely role in
environmental initiatives. 12  Building upon past successful legislative
initiatives, Congress passed more environmental laws and amended laws that
already existed.
From the time of its creation in 1970, EPA was an agency with
concentrated authority and expertise, as well as an institutional stake in
retaining or expanding its role as chief environmental enforcer. Consistent
with the first-mover literature, EPA gained expertise and that expertise in turn
built on itself as EPA attracted a substantial number of highly qualified and
dedicated employees. 29  Furthermore, once federal jurisdiction over
environmental problems was established, the federal government, if it wanted
to, could have chosen to rely upon the constitutional Supremacy Clause to
preempt or dictate the content of state environmental regulation.'30 Thus, the
federal government, as the environmental first-mover, had a far stronger
'26 This concern about being perceived as "soft" on polluters is felt both by federal and
state officials. See, e.g., Ken Steinberg, Regulation: States Have the Ball, CHEMICAL WK.,
Dec. 6, 1989, at 33, 35 (discussing state environmental activism and reporting that "[d]espite
intense industry lobbying, state regulators are keenly aware of early dioxin scares and have
tended to protect themselves from charges of being soft on dioxin"); see also Farber, Politics
and Procedure, supra note 101, at 65 (citing Mark Sagoff's quotation of Republican Richard
Darmon).
127 See LOWRY, supra note 83, at 21-22 (discussing the electoral pressures on federal
politicians).
128 See id. at 22 (quoting Senator Gaylord Nelson's interest in improved environmental
protection); Rubin, Public Choice, supra note 101, at 57 (discussing the role of ideology in
development of governmental policies).
19 See LANDY ET AL., supra note 112, at 9-10, 34-36, 39; MINTZ, supra note 109, at 22-
23. States, in the early days of environmental laws, were viewed as having lower caliber
employees than their federal counterparts. See Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 80, at 1218
& n.87 (noting the difference in caliber between state and federal health and environmental
protection bureaucracies). But see MINTZ, supra note 109, at 74 (discussing the problem in
the mid-1980s of EPA losing qualified employees as they "hit their stride," and suggesting
reasons for the turnover problem).
130 For discussion of the Supremacy Clause as a basis for potential preemption in the
context of federal intervention in real estate finance, see Frank S. Alexander, Federal
Intervention in Real Estate Finance: Preemption and Federal Common Law, 71 N.C. L.
REV. 293, 334-37 (1993).
1997]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
position than would two entities or jurisdictions of equal but competing
power. Generally, however, federal environmental schemes left EPA with
a potential oversight role, but with substantial involvement by the states in
implementing federal goals."' States also had ongoing state court
jurisdiction over state common law environmental claims and explicit
authority to provide greater environmental protections than under federal
law. 13 2 Some reliance on state implementation was inevitable, given the
breadth of tasks assigned to EPA.133
As EPA invested in developing and implementing new statutory and
regulatory initiatives, the regulated community invested heavily in
understanding and complying with federal initiatives.'34 As observed in other
contexts, both the first-mover and those consuming the first-mover's product
(in this case federal environmental law and regulation) confronted incentives
to avoid excessive policy change, even if such change might better achieve
goals of protecting the environment, or even goals of reducing regulatory
burdens.'35 Even with legislation like CERCLA, which has contributed to the
Brownfields problem and has many critics, proposals for legislative change
131 See Percival, Environmental Federalism, supra note 30, at 1173-75.
132 See Andrew Thompson, Note, Free Market Environmentalism and the Common Law:
Confusion, Nostalgia, and Inconsistency, 45 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 1996) (discussing
how states and state courts retained concurrent authority over environmental harms despite
creation of federal environmental laws, and showing how "free market environmentalists"
have erroneously asserted that common law actions were "mugged" by federal statutory
enactments).
133 See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
134 See ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 102, at 44-48 (discussing how CAA provisions
acted to protect certain regional industries and were therefore politically palatable);
Hornstein, supra note 12, at 375-76 (discussing substantial investments of industry in
pollution control strategies).
"' See Robert W. Hahn & Roger G. Noll, Barriers to Implementing Tradable Air
Pollution Permits: Problems of Regulatory Interactions, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 63, 71 (1983)
(stating that "[s]ource-specific standards, although resisted prior to their adoption, can be
competitively advantageous to established firms because they give old sources a cost
advantage over new ones and erect an entry barrier to potential competitors."); see also
David B. Spence, Paradox Lost: Logic, Morality, and the Foundation of Environmental Law
in the 21st Century, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 145, 177 (1995) ("One argument for why
American policy makers have been slow to accept market-based regulatory approaches is
that businesses prefer the existing approach because it provides certainty and familiarity and
poses a barrier to the entry of potential new competitors.") (citing James M. Buchanan &
Gordon Tullock, Polluters'Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes,
AM. ECON. REv., Mar. 1975, at 139).
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have threatened those who have already complied with existing law. 136 In
addition, over time, as legal schemes became more and more complex, both
information and compliance costs associated with pollution control efforts
undoubtedly created at least incidental barriers to new entrants into polluting
industries and created incentives for those already complying with existing
regulations to favor the status quo. 3 7 Furthermore, the more stringent
burdens in federal statutes on new or upgraded sources of water and air
pollution create increased disincentives to new market entrants, or at least to
the creation of new industrial facilities.'38 "Hard look" judicial review of the
factual underpinnings of agency rulemakings has contributed to regulatory
"ossification," further contributing to agency reluctance to change the
regulatory terrain.'39 Thus, those initially burdened by the federal
environmental "first-mover" confronted incentives not to rock the regulatory
boat once compliance efforts were underway.
Consistent with the first-mover phenomenon, the federal
government's environmental preeminence soon dwindled. EPA's resources
136 See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 16, at 390 (discussing concerns of those undertaking
cleanups under current CERCLA scheme with any change that would lessen cleanup
obligations).
137 See Stigler, Economic Regulation, supra note 101 (discussing diverse areas where
regulatory enactments benefit regulated industry by controlling entry of new competitors).
Stigler's examples focus on direct government regulation of particular industries and
markets, but environmental regulatory change similarly would threaten the advantage gained
by industry complying with earlier mandated pollution control strategies. To deter excessive
rapidity of legal change, federal environmental statutes in several places protect the
durability of pollution control investments. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(i)(5) (1994) (stating
that sources of air pollutants establishing a 90 or 95% reduction in hazardous air pollutants
can meet an alternative emission limitation for a period of 6 years); id. § 7521(b)(1)(C)
(forbidding EPA modification of numerical car emission standards until model year 2004).
13 This disincentive to the creation of new industrial facilities was the major focus of a
classic article criticizing the structure of federal environmental laws. See Ackerman &
Stewart, supra note 15. But see Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency:
Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine Tuning" Regulatory Reform, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 1267 (1985) (developing contrary arguments in support of current schemes and
criticizing Ackerman and Stewart's arguments).
See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying'" the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992) (identifying the causes and consequences of ossification
and suggesting various solutions to the problem); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to
Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 66-71 (1995) (examining the effects
of a judicially enforced duty to engage in reasoned decisionmaking).
1997]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
began to lag far behind the mammoth tasks assigned to EPA by Congress. 140
States did not stand by and let federal authorities take over the field of
environmental law. In the generation of environmental laws passed in the
late 1960s and 1970s, states under "cooperative federalism" schemes either
had first crack at meeting federal requirements or could seek to take over
initial federal enforcement of environmental goals.' 4 1 In some instances
implementing state legislation was a prerequisite to states taking over
delegated federal enforcement authority. 42 Under virtually all such schemes,
other than the politically controversial regulation of private wetland
"dredging or filling" under section 404 of the CWA, states took over
enforcement efforts. 43 In fact, even under schemes where states showed lax
enforcement efforts, they fought to retain that authority when challenged by
citizens or the EPA. 44
As discussed in greater detail above, states also followed federal legal
innovations with parallel but independent legislation of their own. In the
passage of a wave of state mini-CERCLAs during the 1980s, state legislators
140 See MINTZ, supra note 109, at 43-44, 114-15 (discussing reductions in EPA's budget
while legal tasks increased); R. Shep Melnick, Pollution Deadlines and the Coalition for
Failure, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 89, 91-97
(Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992) (discussing use of statutory deadlines to
force agency action, and arguing that politicians and environmentalists may benefit from
legislation containing unrealistic goals).
... See generally Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1978)
(discussing the rationale for delegated state programs under federal law).
142 For example, for states to take over CWA industrial permitting, they must establish the
existence of a sufficient state program. This is generally done through legislative and
regulatory enactments. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1994); see also Oliver A. Houck &
Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of
Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242,
1266-70, 1279 (1995) (discussing requirements for state enactment of laws and regulations
to become eligible to take over § 404 tasks).
' See Houck & Rolland, supra note 142, at 1268-70, 1310 (discussing minimal state
interest in taking over implementation of section 404's "dredge and fill" provisions and
referring to such regulatory tasks as a political "minefield").
144 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 777-78, 800,
810, 830 (1992) (discussing states' eagerness to qualify for and retain delegated
implementation and enforcement authority under most federal statutory schemes); see also
Dwyer, Practice, supra note 93, at 1208-14 (discussing state failures to implement CAA
requirements and state opposition to federal intrusion into state implementation efforts);
infra note 190 (citing cases in which state and local governments failed to implement federal
laws but still sought to retain enforcement primacy).
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advocated and pushed for measures closely tracking the coverage of the
federal CERCLA statute.145 In the area of Brownfields-oriented legislation,
states took the lead in devising regulatory strategies to encourage
Brownfields reuse.'46 In numerous areas, several states even enacted
measures surpassing, or at least potentially surpassing, federal levels of
environmental protection.'47 Much as had federal legislators and regulators
starting in the 1960s, state politicians pursued environmental initiatives and
began to share the limelight in an area of initial federal action.
Given all of this state activity, states undoubtedly began to build up
their own institutional competence and attract high quality employees.148
Federal data-gathering and investigation into pollution control strategies
resulted in widespread dissemination to the states of substantial pollution
control information.'49 As states built up their environmental regulatory
apparatus, regulated entities invested in an ongoing state enforcement role. 5 '
Furthermore, state efforts came both later in time than most federal initiatives
and exhibited greater sensitivity to local desires and concerns, particularly the
14s See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 30, 54.
147 For a discussion of areas of state environmental activism, see supra notes 29-30 and
accompanying text, and infra notes 185-88, 217-20 and accompanying text; see also Houck
& Rolland, supra note 142, at 1297-98 (noting occasionally rigorous state protection of
wetlands and coastal areas, but also noting other lax state efforts).
141 See MINTZ, supra note 109, at 25 (describing initial state resistance to federal initiatives
but stating some states began to embrace a more active environmental posture); Dwyer,
Practice, supra note 93, at 1217-18, 1222-23 (discussing how federal reliance on states to
implement federal goals has led to improved state capabilities and sophisticated state
regulation). But see Houck & Rolland, supra note 142, at 1252 (questioning if states have
fiscal and personnel resources to take over task of protecting wetlands).
' See Dwyer, Practice, supra note 93, at 1222-23; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 83, at
614-16 (questioning whether federalism will actually contribute to innovation because
regulatory innovations cannot be "patented" and, therefore, investments in innovation may
be chilled).
50 In the first-mover literature, the resistance of a regulated entity to dealing with new
regulation or a new regulator is referred to as "switching costs." See Lieberman &
Montgomery, supra note 104, at 46. This disincentive to switch may be overcome by other
advantages of the new regulatory scheme. See id. at 48.
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concerns of those bearing the burdens of regulation. 5' The idea that second
and third generation "movers" will show greater flexibility than the first-
mover and adjust to newly developed needs of the consumers of the relevant
product is also a basic tenet of first-mover phenomena.5 2
As a corollary to later "movers" showing greater flexibility and
adjustability to new needs, first-mover literature predicts that the first-
mover's advantaged position will diminish over time due in large part to
bureaucratization, inflexibility, and sunk investments in status quo
structurings"' Consistent with this observation, by the 1980s, EPA's
honeymoon period began to end. Reagan-era appointments of anti-
environmental officials contributed to shoddy EPA performance. 5 4 A pro-
environmental backlash followed, however, and EPA once again had
substantial political and public support.'" Again in the mid-1990s, however,
particularly in the 104th Congress, EPA confronted vituperative criticisms
151 See LOWRY, supra note 83, at 7-9, 48-55, 75-78, 95-96, 115-19 (exploring a variety
of factors leading states to be leaders or innovators in environmental regulation, and
emphasizing the importance of different states' political cultures); Dwyer, Practice, supra
note 93, at 1218 (discussing the need for local implementation of federal goals because of
diversity of conditions throughout the United States). However, as discussed by Professors
Rubin and Feely, the need for sensitivity to local conditions is not an argument for a
federalist scheme with independent state authority, but is an argument for decentralization.
See Rubin & Feely, supra note 73, at 924-26. In fact, EPA itself during the 1980s explored
greater use of its regional offices to capitalize on the benefits of decentralization, after
several years of substantial central office oversight of regional decisions. See MINTZ, supra
note 109, at 30, 42, 65, 70-71. An issue worthy of greater empirical research is whether
regional offices of the EPA feel greater fealty to EPA's central office in Washington, D.C.
or to state authorities, citizens, and industry in the states covered by each region. In his
thorough and authoritative work on EPA's enforcement efforts, Professor Mintz discusses
different attitudes and enforcement practices of officials in EPA's central and regional
offices as partially attributable to the appointment of regional administrators who had
support of state environmental officials for the relevant regions. See id. at 74-75.
152 See Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 104, at 48-49.
See id. (describing studies examining loss of first-mover advantage due to "incumbent
inertia").
' See LANDY ET AL., supra note 112, at 246-48, 250-51; MINTZ, supra note 109, at 40-
59.
"' See LANDY ET AL., supra note 112, at 251-52 (discussing the resignation of EPA
Administrator Gorsuch in light of public outcry, and support for renewed and more active
efforts of new Administrator Ruckelshaus).
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and massive threatened budget cuts. 56 Both the early 1980s critics and those
of the last few years have made much of the federal environmental
bureaucracy becoming too rigid and insensitive to the particularized needs of
the regulated community. 5 7 Much of this talk has been in the context of
pitched political battles and overblown rhetoric. This sense that EPA is
sometimes a lethargic and conservative bureaucracy resistant to change has
been articulated at times, however, by former EPA officials.15 8
In the context of CERCLA, despite the calls of both environmentalists
and industry for means to facilitate cleanups, particularly voluntary cleanups,
EPA was slow to respond. 159 States, however, did respond. States were
undoubtedly the first innovators in efforts to rehabilitate Brownfield sites.
EPA initially resisted this innovation, but faced with substantial criticism and
threatened budget cuts, eventually adopted measures to facilitate Brownfields
remediation and showed a new willingness to share environmental regulatory
turf with the states. 6° Thus, in ways analogous to earlier state efforts to share
regulatory authority with federal officials, federal officials started to respond
in concert with innovative state efforts. Most recently, explicit regional EPA
willingness to forego jurisdiction at sites cleaned up under state authority has
begun to create a coordinated hazardous waste scheme lacking for most of
'56 House Speaker Newt Gingrich called EPA "a highly centralized command bureaucracy
artificially trying to impose its judgment with almost no knowledge of local conditions and
with a static rather than dynamic view of itself." Gary Lee, Gingrich Lashes Out at EPA;
Browner Praises Its Efforts, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1995, at A23 [hereinafter Lee, GingrichStatement]. House Majority Whip Tom DeLay. stated that "EPA, the Gestapo ofgovernment, pure and simply has been one of the major claw hooks that the government has
maintained on the backs of our constituents." Janet Hook, House Rejects Bid to CurtailEPA: Vote Splits GOP Moderates, Conservatives, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 29, 1995, at 3.Republican-led efforts to cut substantially the budget of EPA and several other agencies
contributed to a budget battle standoff and federal government shutdown. See Buzbee,Regulatory Reform, supra note 66, at 303-09 (reporting and citing sources discussing the
budget battles over EPA funding).
157 See, e.g., Lee, Gingrich Statement, supra note 156.
158 See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J.
38, 59 (1975).
' See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text (discussing various EPA initiatives to
encourage voluntary cleanups and Brownfields reuse).6o See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
1997]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
CERCLA's sixteen-year existence. 6' EPA's central office has been less
willing to make such a commitment.
162
Hence, both in the more recent history of hazardous waste regulation
and Brownfields rehabilitation efforts, and in the longer history of federal and
state environmental regulatory efforts, the federal government's sustained
preeminent policymaking role could be largely due to its being the first-
mover, which is largely traceable to Senator Muskie's sensitivity to the
electoral salience of environmental activism.
2. Reasons the Federal Government Moved First
One major gap in the literature on the dynamics of environmental
legislation is an explanation for why Senator Muskie and federal officials
responded first to incipient citizen interest and maintained that preeminent
position for several decades. First-movers sometimes gain their advantaged
position by happenstance or by the luck of having an innovative employee or
official in the ranks.'63 Different preferences or incentives also may explain
first-mover innovation. 1"4 Little reason exists, however, to suppose that
federal officials inherently have stronger environmentally conscious
"preferences" than their state counterparts. Furthermore, while the wave of
environmental awareness during the late 1960s may have constituted a
"republican moment" of public political participation and awareness, why did
it manifest itself in federal legislative activity instead of a wave of state
enactments?'65 Relatedly, why do we find strong federal environmental laws
that are a durable and substantive addition to the legal landscape, not a short-
161 As discussed supra note 98 and accompanying text, EPA could have utilized more
"cooperative agreements" with states under CERCLA, but few such agreements were
finalized.
162 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
163 See Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 104, at 49 (mentioning the role of luck in
entrepreneurial success).
64 For a discussion of how the term "preferences" generally refers to innate tastes while
"incentives" refers to the impact of external pressures or rewards on decisionmaking, and
the difficulty in distinguishing between the two, see Buzbee, Remembering Repose, supra
note 1, at 86-87 & n.171.
165 See Farber, Politics and Procedure, supra note 101, at 66-67 (discussing "republican
moment" explanation for the passage of environmental laws).
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lived set of solely symbolic enactments?'66 Any elected official, federal or
state, starting in the late 1960s could not help but be aware of citizen
environmentalism as an issue of potential political salience. Yet federal
officials acted first and maintained that activism for many years. This
subsection explores how different electoral incentives confronted by federal
and state officials sheds light on why federal officials moved first in
developing substantive environmental laws and regulations.
Professor Elliott and his coauthors point to presidential aspirations as
creating the impetus for the Muskie-Nixon environmental escalation leading
to the stringent CAA Amendments of 1970.167 Election-year dynamics, with
varying characteristics of political opponents, may in fact play a significant
role in explaining the content of federal and state environmental laws. 61
How particular elections and opponents will develop positions on any
particular issue seems to be largely a wild-card factor leading to little in the
way of long-term predictable political outcomes. Few politicians, however,
can risk appearing anti-environmental any longer. 169
166 See id. Federal environmental laws also have their share of largely symbolic provisions
and language, but nevertheless have other provisions creating substantial regulatory burdens.
See John Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990);
Farber, Politics and Procedure, supra note 101, at 68-69; Paul Portney, Policy Watch:
Economics and the Clean Air Act, 4 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 173 (1990); Rubin, Public
Choice, supra note 101, at 22 (criticizing the prediction by public choice scholars that laws
will be largely symbolic).
167 Elliot et al., supra note 121, at 326-29 (discussing how Senator Muskie and President
Nixon engaged in "competitive credit-claiming" preceding their anticipated opposition in
the upcoming presidential race).
161 See id. In New Jersey, election-year politics apparently influenced the willingness of
Governor James Florio, who had a strong reputation as an environmentalist, to soften the
burdens associated with the state's ECRA law. He signed the Industrial Site Recovery Act
("ISRA") amendments, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-6 to -13 (West Supp. 1996), which
substantially reduced regulatory burdens, shortly before running unsuccessfully for a second
term in office. See Lewis Goldshore & Marsha Wolf, Legislative Outlook: New Jersey's
New Priorities, N.J. L.J., June 8, 1992, at 6; Florio Promises to Sign 'Workable' ECRA Bill,
N.J. INDUS. ENVTL. ADVISOR, Mar. 10, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2753252.
169 See Farber, Politics and Procedure, supra note 101, at 65 (stating that "environmental
legislation seems to have a base of support much broader than 'wine and cheese' nature
lovers"). Farber cites to Mark Sagoff's quotation of Republican Richard Darman, one-time
head of the controversial Reagan Office of Management and Budget, who stated:
"Increasingly we are all environmentalists." Id. Darman goes on to include both major
political parties, Jane Fonda, the National Association of Manufacturers, and Bugs Bunny
among his all-inclusive list of environmentalists. Id. (citing Mark Sagoff, Three Essays on
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A body of political science scholarship offers insights into federal
innovation and leadership. No voter can keep apprised of all political views
of all candidates.17 Instead, voters typically rely on other indicators or
proxies for making assumptions about a politician's character or stances on
a range of issues.' Hence, citizens with great frequency vote along party
lines, with a candidate's Democratic or Republican party affiliation assumed
to reflect a likely bundle of political views. 7 2 In low-level or low-visibility
elections, voters tend not even to know the candidates' positions on the
issues.'73 However, electoral analyses reveal increased voter awareness of
Ethics and the Environment, in SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES (1990)).
"70 See Barbara Hinckley, Issues, Information Costs, and Congressional Elections, 4 AM.
POL. Q. 131, 132 (1976) (summarizing past studies, introducing her own study of voter
behavior, and noting that, while voter ignorance can no longer be assumed, "'rational
decisionmakers acquire only a limited amount of information before making choices' limited
by 'the value to [them] of making a correct decision opposed to a incorrect one') (quoting
A. DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 207 (1957)). As Professor Farber
similarly observes, "public choice theory has some well-known difficulties accounting for
the fact that people vote at all" because voters are so unlikely to influence political
outcomes. Farber, Politics and Procedure, supra note 101, at 65.
171 See Rubin, Public Choice, supra note 101, at 34 (critiquing public choice hypotheses
and stating that legislators may show "ideological consistency [to] give[] the legislator an
electoral advantage, akin to brand recognition"). Farber makes an analogous point in stating
that politicians will seek support of environmental groups because "environmental groups
serve something of the same informational purpose as the Underwriter's Laboratory does,
by a placing a stamp of approval on the product." Farber, Politics and Procedure, supra
note 101, at 71.
172 See SHELDON KAMIENIECKI, PARTY IDENTIFICATION, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, AND THE
AMERICAN ELECTORATE 81 (1985) ("Those who lack the necessary time, skill, or motivation
to develop a good understanding of politics probably use familiar cue and symbols to help
them formulate views on issues, candidates, and the political system. Party identification,
no doubt, is an important cue for many Americans."); Hinckley, supra note 170, at 138-42,
147 (finding substantially lower levels of voter awareness of actual candidate positions on
issues in congressional elections than in senate or presidential elections). This is not to deny
that voters will over time sometimes change their party affiliations. For an exploration of
how party affiliations develop and may change, see KAMIENIECKI, supra, at chs. 1, 2, 6 &
7.
173 See Hinckley, supra note 170, at 138-39.
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candidates' actual stands as one moves to higher-visibility elections. 74 Voter
surveys reveal a notably higher incidence of issue-based knowledge of voters
in elections for the Senate than for the House of Representatives. 17
Similarly, in presidential elections one finds an even higher incidence of
voters with knowledge about candidates' stands on the issues. 176
This research is consistent with greater federal environmental
activism because, with the possible exception of state gubernatorial elections,
federal legislative elections involve greater advertising and actual voter
knowledge of issue stances than do state elections. 177 Voters at low cost to
themselves obtain actual information about candidate positions. State
legislators, in contrast, use far less mass media advertising or debates and are
less likely to be elected based on anything other than their party affiliation. 78
174 See id. at 147-48. In higher-visibility elections, such as senate races, exploitation of
issue differences may be particularly important in attracting crossover voters usually
supporting the opposing party or in attracting independents. See Alan I. Abramowitz, A
Comparison of Voting for US. Senator and Representative in 1978, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
633, 636-37 (1980) ("While ideological proximity to the incumbent had a negligible impact
on candidate choice in House elections, it had a substantial impact on candidate choice in
Senate elections among . . . independents and supporters of the challenger's party.").
Similarly, increased information availability from other sources impacts voters' issue
awareness and anticipated voting behavior. See Bryon St. Dizier, The Effect of Newspaper
Endorsements and Party Identification on Voting Choice, 62 JOURNALISM Q. 589 (1985)
(exploring the impact of newspaper editorials on voter knowledge and behavior); James W.
Dyson & Frank P. Scioli, Jr., Communication and Candidate Selection: Relationships of
Information and Personal Characteristics to Vote Choice, 55 Soc. Sci. Q. 77 (1979)
(showing how varying degrees of exposure of a study group to an actual campaign debate
can influence voters' choices among candidates).
' See Abramowitz, supra note 174, at 633; Hinckley, supra note 170, at 147-49. For
other studies analyzing the relationship of issue-based voting, information costs, and party
affiliation, see, for example, Stephen C. Craig, Partisanship, Independence, and No
Preference: Another Look at the Measurement of Party Identification, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI.
274 (1985); Richard Murray & Arnold Vedlitz, Party Voting in Lower Level Electoral
Contests, 59 Soc. ScI. Q. 752 (1979).
176 See Hinckley, supra note 170, at 147-48.
7 See id. at 132-33 (discussing how differential costs of obtaining information about
candidates is a likely explanation for different levels of issue awareness in elections for
congressional or senate seats, and suggesting a need for increased media coverage to foster
informed voting).
178 Hinckley notes the small number of studies analyzing state and district samples, but
notes that these earlier studies "indicate[] low levels of voter interest in and information
about these races .... " Id. at 132. For studies showing how increased information
availability influences voter choices, see supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
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State candidates hence have a comparatively weaker incentive than federal
candidates to establish their environmental credentials or commit to a
particular position on environmental issues. State and federal candidates face
an overlapping electorate, but state candidates' personal issue stances are less
likely to have impacts on electoral outcomes. Further adding to these
different electoral incentives faced by state officials is greater state official
concern with attracting or retaining industry. Federal legislators also share
an interest in their jurisdictions' economic health, but they are less likely to
have direct ongoing contacts with regulated entities impacted by federal
legislation.
Despite these greater federal electoral incentives to establish pro-
environment credentials, particularly as one moves up the electoral ladder to
senate or presidential elections, the preeminent position of the federal
government and the EPA as the chief environmental policymaker has
lessened as states have gained greater competence and shown greater
willingness to enact environmental laws and regulations. As shown above,
much of that erosion of the advantaged federal position is explainable by
first-mover dynamics. Given states' increased activity and competence,
coupled with the view of the normative federalists that, when in doubt, states
should be the prime lawmakers for the nation, has the time come for a
paradigm shift whereby the federal government surrenders environmental turf
to the states? 179 In this history of copycat legislative enactments and
alternating innovations, does the evidence support the states assuming the
preeminent role? State initiatives actually present a mixed picture and cast
substantial doubt on the wisdom of proposals to reduce substantially the
federal role in environmental protection.
B. State Stringency or a Preference for Local Enforcement?
Twenty years ago Professor Stewart questioned whether states had the
"incentives to assume the administrative and political burdens of carrying out
[federal] environmental policies dictated by federal agencies."' ° If one
"7 The concept of "paradigm shifts" was developed by Thomas Kuhn's influential book,
2 THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). Professor Plater similarly has
looked at the early history of environmental law as a paradigm shift to the "Rachel Carson
Paradigm," calling human beings to acknowledge the negative effects of their actions, even
if such effects are ignored by the marketplace. Plater, supra note 110, at 982.
180 Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 80, at 1202.
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thinks federal environmental enactments are unlikely because of concentrated
industry opposition and dispersed regulatory beneficiaries, then stringent and
unmandated state environmental laws appear to be even more of a democratic
miracle. 81 Yet states have sought delegated federal authority under most
statutory schemes and have enacted further parallel and sometimes more
stringent environmental laws of their own. One magazine recently posited
that "the states are forging ahead on their own because the Congress and
White House can't or won't champion meaningful environmental
reform-even on issues such as the greenhouse effect that have causes and
consequences far beyond any state's borders."' 82 A federal judge recently
questioned the need for an increased federal environmental law role when
"[s]tates have a substantial interest in protecting their citizens and state
resources." ' 3 The judge went on to support this assertion of state interests
in environmental protection by referring to state "counterparts to CERCLA
and the EPA."' 84 If these and other similar statements are correct in positing
that state politicians and agencies are newly sensitized to the goal of
environmental protection, then a federal leadership or supervisory role would
appear unnecessary.
Oddly, little in environmental federalism literature has applied basic
insights of past analysts of the dynamics of legislation and regulation to
examine state activity skeptically to see if apparent environmental zeal of the
states may sometimes reflect other motivations of legislators, regulators, or
others impacted by the law. This section takes a few first steps to provide
such an analysis.
A key development requiring analysis is the numerous state
enactments that, at least on their face, reveal states are willing to regulate
some types of pollution or pollution risks more stringently than required by
181 For a discussion of why environmental laws are viewed as unlikely, and the genesis of
"capture" theories of legislation and regulation, see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
18' Susan Begley et al., E Pluribus, Plures: With Leadership from Washington, the States
Set the Environmental Agenda for the Nation, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 13, 1989, at 70 (quoted in
Revesz, supra note 82, at 1229). This article is referring to the three jurisdictions that have
enacted laws restricting use of CFCs, which threaten protective ozone in the stratosphere.
Id.
183 Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1250 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (quoted in Revesz, supra note 82, at 1241 n. 109). In Anspec, then-Judge
Kennedy addressed whether a federal common law role was appropriate.
184 Revesz, supra note 82, at 1241 n.109.
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federal law. 85 In some areas, particularly state protections of ground water
supplies and regulation of toxic pollutants, several states' regulatory
standards are more stringent than their federal counterparts. 86 Analysis of
the histories of these laws reveals environmental activists and committed
politicians, or sometimes committed citizens and reluctant politicians,
pursuing goals of environmental and public health protection.'87 Many of
181 See id. at 1227-29.
'86 See id. at 1228-29 (citing to areas of stringent state standards). A number of areas of
state stringency are actually attributable to concerns other than environmental protection.
Other areas of apparently independent state environmental activism appear, upon closer
examination, frequently to be attributable either to a state's particular need to protect a
resource or heightened citizen concerns due to a recent past disaster or imminent threat. See,
e.g., James E. Beaver et al., Stormy Seas? Analysis of New Oil Pollution Laws in the West
Coast States, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 791, 793-96 (1994) (discussing West Coast states'
oil pollution statutes and noting the exposure of Alaska and California to major oil spills in
the past); Benjamin R. Vance, Comment, Total Aquifer Management: A New Approach to
Groundwater Protection, 30 U.S.F. L. REv. 803 (1996) (discussing ground water protection
and stringent regulation by states dependent on ground water). Several states have shown
leadership in pollution prevention laws, but those statutes actually only require preparation
of pollution prevention plans, not their implementation. See Bert Black & David Hollander,
Forced Volunteerism: The New Regulatory Push to Prevent Pollution, 16 Chem. Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 1996 (1993). More than half of these statutes followed closely in time behind the
federal Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13,101-13,109 (Supp. 111990). See
Black & Hollander, supra, at 1996, 2000. Several states' areas of activism, however, are
hard to explain except as reflecting a strong state political will to regulate environmental
harms rigorously. See LOWRY, supra note 83, at 53-54, 75-78, 95-96, 115-19; see also
Damon M. Chappie et al., Pollution Control 20 Years After Earth Day: A Retrospective on
Federal Environmental Programs, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 123, 124 (May 4, 1990) (discussing
the existence, as of 1990, of state air toxics programs "above and beyond the federal
program") (citation omitted); Dwyer, Practice, supra note 93, at 1223 (citing California's
leadership in regulating hazardous air pollutants).
187 See, e.g., Mike Ward, Republicans, Environmentalists Praise Tenacious Democrat Who
Is Influencing How State Is Handling Toxic Waste, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1987, at I
(reporting on efforts of Tanner to respond to contaminated wells with state mini-CERCLA
statute); see also LOWRY, supra note 83, at 8-9, 48-55, 75-78, 95-96, 115-19 (describing
examples of state officials exhibiting environmental leadership and pride in creating
effective environmentally protective schemes).
California's Proposition 65, which was passed directly by the electorate in 1986,
is an innovative measure that requires industry disclosure of chemical risks posed by the
food supply on the environment. Although it was supported at one point by as many as 83%
of Californians, industry opposed the initiative, as did both the incumbent governor and a
leading candidate for. the U.S. Senate. It ultimately passed with the support of 63% of
voters. See Seth B. Whitelaw, Proposition 65 v. Industry: David Against Goliath or a
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these state enactments are further counter-evidence to proponents of the
thesis that regulations will inevitably benefit industry. As with the history of
federal environmental laws, at least some state laws appear motivated by
electoral incentives and ideological commitment to protect the environment.
These laws also cast substantial doubt on overly-strong predictions that states
will capitulate to the pressures of local industry, particularly when states
confront potential industry flight.188
A contrary group of state laws, however, raise an opposite concern.
Professor Organ has critiqued many states' recent laws prohibiting state
regulators from enacting measures surpassing federal standards in
stringency.'89 These state enactments reveal ongoing state concern with
regulating so stringently that local industry will be lost to states that are less
stringent. 90 These laws constitute at least a counterweight to the assertion
that concerns about a race-to-the-bottom are not a factor impacting the
content of state regulation or enforcement. Many states rarely show any
environmental leadership and frequently fail even to meet federal
requirements.' 9'
Misled Public Run Amok, 44 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 677 (1989) (discussing the history and
dynamics of Proposition 65); Paul Kemezis et al., Proposition 65: As California Goes,
CHEMICAL WK., Oct. 29, 1986, at 7 (discussing the same proposition). It is thus both an
example of the public's strong support for protection from industrial and environmental
hazards and an example of how politicians, confronted with industry opposition and
electoral support, may be swayed by industry sentiment. See Whitelaw, supra.
"' As Professor Revesz noted in his race-to-the-bottom analysis, more stringent state
standards cast doubt on the prediction of state laxity in an area of industry mobility. Revesz,
supra note 82, at 1228-29.
"9 Organ, supra note 107, at 1373.
190 See id. at 1388-89 n.74.
19 See Dwyer, Practice, supra note 93, at 1203-04, 1209-14 (reviewing CAA areas of
implementation failure); Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through It: The Failure of State
Enforcement in the Clean Water Act (Jan. 1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author) (analyzing disparities in states' environmental enforcement practices under delegated
CWA authority). Two recent newspaper articles review assertions that numerous states
operating under delegated federal authority have enforced inadequately those problems. See
John H. Cushman, Jr., States Neglecting Pollution Rules, White House Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1996, at Al; John H. Cushman, Jr., Virginia Seen as Undercutting US.
Environmental Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1997, at Al1. See generally Lynda L. Butler,
State Environmental Programs: A Study in Political Influence and Regulatory Failure, 31
WM. & MARY L. REv. 823, 824 & nn.3-6 (1990). A number of recent cases reflect state
enforcement problems. See e.g., Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding
that the state's proposed implementation plan lacked adequate enforceability because of
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In the Brownfields and hazardous waste arena, one finds parallel state
and federal enactments. Why would states take on a regulatory task of
supervising and approving voluntary cleanups when federal officials avoided
such a role? Two previously recognized explanations appear likely, as well
as one explanation for state regulatory activity that has not been previously
identified.
The first possible explanation can be drawn from the first-mover
phenomenon. Later parallel state enactments are consistent with first-mover
literature which predicts that entities will have incentives to let others be
innovators and pay the price for potential mistakes.'92 If the regulatory
innovation is popular or achieves its goal, later entities can copy the
innovator; regulatory innovation is not patentable. '93 Thus, later parallel state
mini-CERCLAs, while frequently explained in terms of state perceptions of
the need for even more stringent environmental protection, raised relatively
few risks for state legislators seeking to establish their environmental
credentials. States may have acted precisely because federal innovations
made state copycatting low cost and low risk.'94
Second, state activity in the hazardous waste cleanup area is also
partially attributable to state fiscal concerns. One goal of parallel state
enactments was to ensure adequate state resources to investigate
contaminated sites, propose them for inclusion on the CERCLA NPL of
contaminated sites, and thereby vie for federal Superfund dollars. States that
first enacted mini-CERCLAs had the largest number of sites on the NPL and
minimal access to judicial review of participants in the regulatory process, and upholding
EPA action disapproving of Virginia's proposed plan); Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F.
Supp. 865 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (reviewing Georgia's history of failure to implement CWA
provisions requiring strategies to protect water quality); American Lung Ass'n v. Kean, 670
F. Supp. 1285 (D.N.J. 1987), aff'd, 871 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding state failure to
implement a SIP); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of
Envtl. Conservation, 668 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that the state failed to
implement a SIP).
192 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 83, at 594, 604-05.
'9 See id.; Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies, supra note 104, at 541.
'9 CERCLA was, however, chronologically preceded by similar, although less strong and
less funded, state "spill" statutes in two states. See supra note 26.
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therefore were eligible for federal dollars.'95 Similarly, without establishment
of mini-CERCLA laws and new funding sources for site investigations and
cleanups, state fiscal resources would have been threatened by emergency
cleanup expenditures. 96
A different type of fiscal concern explains other areas of apparent
state environmental activism, particularly in states choosing to regulate car
pollution more stringently than required by federal law. 197 State choices to
regulate stringently sources of pollutants regulated under National Ambient
Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") are driven largely by federal CAA
requirements that states meet NAAQS or face federal sanctions. 98 Several
other areas of stringent state regulation are attributable to federal CAA
NAAQS.' 99 Thus, while states may not always be required to regulate
particular sources more stringently than under federal standards, the choice
to control stringently one pollution source rather than another has often been
driven by federal NAAQS requirements.
A third and perhaps novel observation can be drawn from state
19' New Jersey, the first state to pass a state superfund statute, had the most sites (62) on
the NPL. Minnesota, also among the first states with such a law, ranked second with 46
sites. See Denise Gambino, Tar Creek Drops to 50 on Most Dangerous Waste List, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 21, 1982, available in 1982 WL 2386506; see also Charles Bartsch &
Richard Munson, Restoring Contaminated Industrial Sites, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Mar. 22,
1994, at 74 (discussing state legislators' support for mini-CERCLAs to allow investigation
of sites and have them placed on the NPL).
196 Even with the passage of mini-CERCLAs, all of which utilized a broad variety of
funding sources, many states lacked adequate resources to supervise or undertake all
contamination cleanups. See, e.g., Indiana Getting a Handle on Its Toxic-Waste Sites,
ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., June 25, 1987, at 12 (reporting that only $2.8 million remains in
Indiana's Hazardous Substances Trust Fund, but noting that the new state Superfund statute
gave Indiana power to sue pollution generators for cleanup costs and treble damages).
' For example, the northeast states decided to adopt the more stringent automobile
emission limitations strategies that were required only in California. See LOWRY, supra note
83, at 1.
198 In nonattainment areas for ozone and carbon monoxide, reduction in car pollution is
a key strategy. States face a choice of regulating cars or other sources to meet federal
standards. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (citing and discussing cases involving
SIP implementation failures).
' See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, To Fight Smog, 8 Northeast States Adopt Curbs on Power
Plants, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1992, at Al. New York and New Jersey similarly committed
because of CAA NAAQS, to regulate a broad array of consumer products without a federal
mandate to choose those particular ozone-contributing pollution sources. See supra note 191
and accompanying text (discussing SIP implementation failures).
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voluntary cleanup and mini-CERCLA enactments. While new state
environmental laws and regulations add a new layer of law for industry to
heed, they may paradoxically be intended to reduce or displace enforcement
threats posed by federal regulators. These enactments do not legally preclude
ongoing parallel federal enforcement. As a practical matter, however, they
have an additional impact of substantially reducing the likelihood of
unsought federal intervention at sites of concern.00 As discussed above,
states have explicitly sought federal commitment to forbear any ability to
revisit state-supervised voluntary cleanups.20 ' Notions of comity, coupled
with limited federal dollars and excessive legal burdens on EPA, make
federal activism substantially less likely once states enact parallel regulatory
schemes and act at sites that would otherwise be of possible federal concern.
State parallel activity here therefore may be explainable in part by the
following dynamic. Once industry confronts the inevitability of
environmental regulation, state regulators offer several advantages; key
among them is a greater sensitivity to local industry's needs. Concern with
capital exit might lead state regulators to go easier on liable parties than
would federal regulators, particularly in states where enforcement officials
are not insulated from political pressure.20 2 Furthermore, any explicit or de
facto delegation of authority to an agent (here the states), allows for some
"slippage" or "drift"20 3 from the principal's ideal goal.0 In the context of
Brownfields efforts, regulation of contaminated sites, and voluntary cleanup
schemes, the federal government seldom has delegated authority to the states,
but state activity as a practical matter has displaced most potential federal
activity, even if a state's decisions might be different from what federal
officials would make on their own.
Parallel state environmental enactments thus create several potential
200 See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
202 Professor Lowry observes that state institutional structures impact the zeal with which
state officials enforce state environmental laws. See LOWRY, supra note 83, at 7, 53-54. He
also observes that in the process of environmental enforcement, efficient state permitting
processes are a source of pride. See id. at 49 (describing Wisconsin's air pollution control
scheme).
203 See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control ofAgencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431,439
(1989).




benefits to state legislators. State legislators can take electoral credit for
enactment of facially pro-environment laws. While state officials may at
times feel significant industry pressure, federal and state officials both have
electoral incentives to respond to similar public pro-environment
sentiment.2 °5 State legislators also can respond to industry desires for local
regulation over federal regulation," 6 if regulation of an activity is inevitable
even without state intervention.20 7 Especially in the context of contaminated
real property, once entities interested in such properties confront potential
liability under federal law, any state regulatory activity reducing the degree
of uncertainty about liability is attractive.20 8 Thus, support for state mini-
CERCLAs and voluntary cleanup initiatives at least in part results from the
preceding existence of potential federal law-based liability. 9
Furthermore, a considerable body of empirical and theoretical
literature posits that officials within bureaucracies will act to seek expansion
of agency turf and budgets.210 The universality or dominance of this
phenomenon has been questioned because of other incentives confronted by
205 However, as discussed above, state legislators probably feel fewer electoral incentives
than federal legislators to establish their environmental credentials.
206 Were state regulation to involve an area of national production and high costs of varied
compliance standards, industry might in fact prefer a uniform legal obligation over diverse
state approaches. See Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 80, at 1215.
207 See MINTZ, supra note 109, at 23 (discussing how early EPA pursuit of industry was
opposed by state officials acting on behalf of industry).
208 Cf LOWRY, supra note 83, at 47-53 (reporting that Wisconsin's streamlining of the
permitting process for stationary air pollution sources was an area of state pride and
perceived competition).
209 As stated by a B.F. Goodrich official about the legal "layering" of federal and state
regulations, "closer is better. Industry can accept the concept of control becoming more
palatable and sensible as it gets closer to the regulated industry." See William C. Becker,
Out of the Federal Frying Pan, CHEMICAL WK., June 10, 1981, at 5.
210 For theoretical literature developing this hypothesis, see, for example, John Baden &
Richard L. Stroup, Introduction, in BUREAUCRACY VS. ENVIRONMENT: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNANCE 5 (John Baden & Richard L.
Stroup eds., 1981); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT ch. 4 (1971). For an empirical application of the bureaucratic expansion
hypothesis, see, for example, Fred S. McChesney, Government as Definer of Property
Rights: Indian Lands, Ethnic Externalities, and Bureaucratic Budgets, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.
297 (1990).
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officials."' Nevertheless, concerns about job security, patronage, and
responsiveness to desires of local industry create strong reasons for state
officials, both in the legislature and within agencies, to favor state assumption
of environmental regulatory turf in lieu of federal regulators handling similar
tasks. Such state incentives are especially strong if the underlying laws and
regulations leave regulators with room for discretionary judgments.212
Contrasting federal resistance to involvement in voluntary cleanup
initiatives is traceable, among several interrelated factors, to relatively greater
rewards for local governments as sites are returned to productive reuse and
become job or tax-producing facilities.2"3 Federal officials would confront
little more than new work, in which the risk of error and public outcry would
be substantial.2 4 If, as others have posited, agency officials will usually seek
turf expansion and increased budgets, such a goal for federal officials was
apparently overwhelmed by concerns about risk and lack of positive political
incentives. 15
To put the previous paragraphs' points differently, states' activism
and increased competence in the environmental area are largely traceable to
the federal first-mover and the benefits of vertical federal-state competition
2"1 See Buzbee, Remembering Repose, supra note 1, at 82-96 (discussing and critiquing
the bureaucratic expansion hypothesis in the context of EPA's reluctance to assume greater
responsibility for overseeing and approving voluntary contamination cleanups); see, e.g.,
Peter H. Aranson, Theories of Economic Regulation: From Clarity to Confusion, J.L. & POL.
247, 279-82 (1990); Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Agency Growth, Salaries and
the Protected Bureaucrat, 27 ECON. INQUIRY 431, 448 (1989); Louis De Alessi, On the
Nature and Consequences of Private and Public Enterprise, 67 MINN. L. REv. 191, 206
(1982).
22 See supra note 143 and accompanying text (citing to authorities discussing the general
lack of state interest in assuming delegated authority to administer the CWA "dredge and
fill" responsibilities because of the inflexibility and political riskiness of such decisions);
infra notes 218-22.
213 See Buzbee, Remembering Repose, supra note 1, at 113-14.
214 Part of EPA's reluctance to take on such a task is rooted in EPA's own history. In the
1980s, lax cleanup approvals led to substantial congressional oversight and accusations of
"sweetheart deals" between EPA and impacted industry. EPA officials have explicitly
attributed EPA reluctance to the "sweetheart deal" debacle. See id. at 81 (quoting an EPA
official's statement that "folks will be all over our backs if we make a mistake" as occurred
in the 1980s).
See id. at 82-96 (discussing the budgetary expansion hypothesis and countervailing




for political credit. States benefited from copying (with some variation)
federal schemes, and passed their own first-mover innovation of voluntary
cleanup schemes, in part to reduce uncertainty and liability fears resulting
from federal law. States also increased in competence and expertise due to
delegated federal programs and access to federal databases about pollution
control strategies. Thus, state activity is at least partially the result of
preceding federal initiatives. If, as posited above, state environmental
activity is in part intended to create a de facto displacement of federal
enforcement, or at least to reduce the likelihood of federal intervention, then
these state laws cannot be assumed to reflect independent or durable state
commitment to environmental protection.2 16
Nevertheless, retained spheres of state sovereignty, or at least areas
of state implementation discretion, still provide regulatory benefits. As
others have predicted about the dynamics of federalism, especially state
versus state competitive federalism, once one state created a legal innovation
attractive to industry interested in investing in Brownfield sites, other states
passed similar measures.217 Without retained state authority to create
innovative strategies, states would not have created these schemes reducing
incentives to abandon Brownfield sites.
Given substantial state interest in attracting or retaining industry, one
would expect even facially stringent state laws to provide some room for state
officials involved with the implementation or enforcement process to respond
to industry concerns. A provocative United States General Accounting
Office Study supports the soundness of such an expectation. 2 8 This study
reviewed how states establish and apply environmental standards in cleaning
up contaminated sites, with a particular focus on states with more protective
standards than under federal law.219 Greater stringency was found under
portions of several states' laws, but under most more protective soil
216 See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text (quoting statements assuming state
environmental initiatives are always intended to strengthen environmental protection if they
appear to do so).
217 Each state's voluntary cleanup scheme varies, but they have many common provisions.
See Buzbee, supra note 1, at 118-22 (setting forth a table summarizing attributes of state
voluntary cleanup schemes); see also Geltman, supra note 1, at 4 (setting forth a similar
table summarizing state voluntary cleanup and related Brownfields initiatives).
211 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND: How STATES ESTABLISH AND APPLY
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS WHEN CLEANING UP SITES (1996).
219 See id.
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cleanliness requirements, state authorities linked that stringency with
flexibility to modify obligations in the process of implementing those
standards. 221 Similarly, after the first wave of mini-CERCLAs, states cut
back on the stringency of those laws by adding provisions responsive to
industry concerns. 22' Analogous sensitivity to industry concerns is found in
the funding sources for most states' mini-CERCLAs; such state laws draw on
a larger number of funding sources than their federal CERCLA counterpart,
which is funded primarily by taxes on the most polluting industries. These
observations are consistent with the thesis that states will enact
environmental laws either in response to democratic pressure or to take
electoral credit, but also seek through the implementation process or an
amendment process to show sensitivity to industry concerns.
A remaining question is whether more immutable differences in state
220 See id. at 2-3, 11-13, 17. Unlike soil standard requirements, states are less willing to
allow implementation flexibility in dealing with ground water contamination, although there
too some states allow implementation to modify presumptively applicable requirements. See
id. at 15, 18-20. As discussed above regarding first-mover dynamics, federal regulations,
practices, and requirements are still utilized by most states as at least the starting point for
state regulatory decisionmaking. See id. at 12, 15 (presenting tables showing that a
substantial number of states utilize federal requirements or risk assessment assumptions,
with few deviations).
22 New Jersey's innovative ECRA statute was "reformed" in response to industry
concerns that New Jersey's regulatory burdens were creating "an anti-industrial climate in
New Jersey." David Gill, The ECRA Threat, Bus. J. N.J., Feb. 1, 1989, at 68, available in
1989 WL 2579435 (also including a statement by a corporate executive that, while "few
companies will say it publicly, many refuse to locate any new industrial operation in New
Jersey"). New Jersey subsequently enacted ISRA, amending ECRA. See Brent Bowers,
New Jersey Loosens Environmental Noose, but Some Firms Still Gag, WALL ST. J., July 28,
1993, at B2. Minnesota, another state mini-CERCLA leader, also softened its mini-
CERCLA statute in subsequent amendments, and enacted a comprehensive voluntary
cleanup approval scheme. See John B. Casserly, Comment, Minnesota's Land Recycling
Act: Solving Problems by Evolving Superfund, 2 Wis. ENVTL. L.J. 261 (1995).
222 See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 8.1(B)(3) (2d ed. 1994)
(discussing the Superfund and its funding primarily from the likely polluting industries);
EPA, 50-STATE STUDY, supra note 26, at 16-23 (discussing the variety of sources used for
funding state mini-CERCLAs); Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund') Act of 1980, 8 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 1, 12-13 (1982) (discussing funding of the federal Superfund). Similarly, state
pollution prevention laws, while evidence of state leadership and innovation, actually require




and federal governments may nonetheless lead to a preference for a
predominant federal or state role in environmental regulation, assuming the
goal is achievement of stated environmental objectives. Several tentative
conclusions can be drawn about relative state and federal suitability to act as
an environmental policymaker. Federal authorities likely will be less
sensitive to concerns of local industry and citizens' needs than will state and
local regulators.223 Federal officials will generally be indifferent to industry
threats to move from one state to another. At the standard or regulation-
setting stage, however, the recent history of state activism, at a minimum,
calls into question overly-rigid assumptions about state laxity.224 As much
as federal officials seek to capitalize on electoral interest in environmental
protection, state officials face similar but somewhat weaker incentives. In
higher-visibility legislative or rulemaking battles, any state official
capitulation to industry could be noted and lead to allegations that
capitulating officials were anti-environmental.225
In lower-visibility contexts, however, such as negotiations over
cleanup obligations at a particular site, state officials would again face strong
incentives to retain or attract industry, but would face a lower likelihood of
public scrutiny or a negative electoral reaction.2 6 At times, zealous local
interest in a particular site would reduce the odds of capitulation, but state
officials would still be more vulnerable to industrial migration threats than
223 See Houck & Rolland, supra note 142, at 1311.
224 As stated supra note 101 and accompanying text, some stringent state environmental
laws and regulations cannot be explained away as the result of some variant on industry
capture of state political processes.
225 These observations are consistent with political science literature finding issue-based
voting going up as information costs go down. See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying
text. In addition, as Professor Revesz argues, precluding lower state environmental
standards would merely force competing jurisdictions to offer other regulatory or tax
advantages to industry. See Revesz, supra note 82, at 1245-46.
226 Professor Anthony has made an analogous observation in criticizing agency over-
reliance on interpretive rules and policy statements in lieu of notice and comment rules. See
Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the
Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public? 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1319
(1992) (stating that nonlegislative documents "may enable the agency to operate at a lower
level of visibility, with greater discretion and with fewer checks from the public and the
courts").
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would be federal officials.227 This likely difference in concern about industry
threats is an immutable characteristic of state and federal governments under
our Constitution. Even without the benefits of alternating innovations in a
federalist scheme, some federal oversight role would reduce the likelihood
of state or local surrender to industry demands.
The nature of the environmental amenity or medium to be regulated
or protected may also influence the appropriate mix of federal and state
authority. Federal regulation of nationally marketed pollution sources, like
cars or paints, makes great sense, and in fact is supported by industry to avoid
diverse and burdensome state requirements. 228 Furthermore, by regulating a
consumer product, no government faces a significant threat of capital flight.
In contrast, in the context of stationary sources of air and water pollution,
Professor Lowry observes that "the presence of economic pressure... makes
... state supersedure [or exceedance] of federal standards rare. 229 In the area
of hazardous waste cleanups, particularly when dealing with persons who
may be making elective choices about where to invest their capital and
whether to become involved in a contamination cleanup, the relatively
immobile nature of the contamination itself does not eliminate concerns
about interjurisdictional competition leading to relaxed regulatory treatment.
Concern with attracting or retaining capital investment will heighten the
sensitivity of state officials to the desires of potential Brownfields
investors.230
227 As I have previously argued, this disparity in political influence may prevent state
officials from even knowing about citizen concerns. The race-to-the-bottom rationale
critiqued by Professor Revesz assumes that state officials know of citizens' political
preferences, but sacrifice them in light of industry threats of migration; it is unclear if the
disparate stakes of citizens and industry will reduce officials' awareness of citizen sentiment.
See Buzbee, Remembering Repose, supra note 1, at 114-16.
228 See LOWRY, supra note 83, at ch. 4; Industry Fears Patchwork of State Rules Under
EPA Waste Regs, INSIDE EPA, Mar. 24. 1995, at 5; Industry Fears Regulatory Patchwork:
States Move Own Clean Air Paint Standards, Fearing EPA Delay, INSIDE EPA, May 13,
1994, at 14-15.
229 See LOWRY, supra note 83, at 47.
230 But see Clifton J. McFarland, Federalism and CERCLA Programs, NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV'T, Summer 1994, at 29, 30-31 (discounting the "business flight problem" as a
rationale for federal intervention in cleanup of contaminated sites because "a company
cannot relocate hazardous substances that have previously been disposed"). Mr.
McFarland's discounting of the capital mobility problem fails to acknowledge its continued




C. Assessing the Brownfields Policy Options
EPA's track record of resistance to involvement in approving
voluntary cleanups makes one pessimistic that EPA will assume any
increased role at sites not already identified as federal priority sites. Indeed,
federal Brownfields initiatives to date offer dollars, give greater assurance to
categories of PRPs that they will not be pursued, and may eventually offer
state and local governments assurances of federal noninterference. No
federal site-specific or programmatic oversight is yet in place or offered.
If one views hazardous waste cleanups as largely a local issue,
generally not involving an interstate pollution problem, and if one of the
goals of federalism is to further democratic accountability, why should
federal tax dollars in the form of subsidies or grants pay for such efforts?23 '
One reason is simply tied to an ability to pay: federal tax proceeds give the
federal government substantial capability to underwrite and encourage
hazardous waste cleanups. In addition, although quite paltry to date, federal
Brownfields and cleanup initiatives allow federal politicians to show both
their interest in environmental protection and in economic renewal.232
231 In her opinion in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), Justice O'Connor
explained the Court's striking down of the "take title" provision of a federal law because if
federal law could "commandeer" state processes for federal ends, "the accountability of both
state and federal officials [would be] diminished ... [the responsible level of government
should] suffer the consequences ... [and] bear the brunt of public disapproval." Id. at 168-
69.
232 This rationale is akin to the explanation Professor Macey offers for why federal
officials will use our federalist structure and delegate enforcement or implementation tasks
to the states. He posits that federal officials may maximize net benefits to themselves by
allocating certain tasks to state or subordinate officials, much as legislators may benefit by
delegating difficult tasks to administrators. See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to
Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice
Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 267 (1990). Here, by providing funding
instead of micromanaging or directly overseeing Brownfields rehabilitation efforts, federal
officials may maximize benefits to themselves, either in the form of political credit or
perhaps avoidance of criticism. Alternatively, federal officials may be making a public-
regarding decision about how best to foster Brownfields reuse. See Mashaw, supra note 119
(questioning the hypothesis that broad delegations to agencies are solely motivated by
political self-interest). See also Rubin, Public Choice, supra note 101, at 36, 44
(questioning the re-election maximizer hypothesis because of its failure to acknowledge
complicated motivations of politicians, and stating that "[t]o view legislators as motivated
solely by self-interest is to deny them the level of humanity that scholars claim on their own
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Brownfields grants present a quintessential win-win situation for federal
authorities. First, consistent with political rhetoric of EPA's critics and
advocates of regulatory reform, current federal Brownfields programs entail
reduced federal micromanagement and greater deference to state and local
decisionmakers.233 In addition, even if these grants are ineffective, their
ineffectiveness will be revealed years later. If these grants succeed in
catalyzing local and industry Brownfields efforts, federal officials could
legitimately share credit for a more productive economy and cleaner
environment. If, however, states perceive private momentum to cleanup
Brownfield sites, it is doubtful that federal dollars are needed. States will
offer monetary, environmental, and tax benefits to attract industry, as they
have for decades.234 Nevertheless, state perceptions of interjurisdictional
battles for industry might deter Brownfields expenditures from state funds,
much as states have historically been wary of expenditures for the dwindling
social welfare safety net programs.235
On balance, federal subsidization of Brownfields rehabilitation
efforts, coordinated principally by state and local governments, is
appropriate. State and local governments have much greater familiarity with
local market and political dynamics and a higher proportionate stake in the
success of Brownfields rehabilitation than do federal authorities. Federal
subsidies are "harnessing" natural political incentives of state and local
governments to further ends shared by federal and state officials.236 In
addition, because federal dollars are spent on Brownfields initiatives, it is less
likely that the federal government would take any enforcement steps that
could stigmatize a contaminated site and thereby jeopardize the benefits
behalf').
233 See Houck & Rolland, supra note 142, at 1311 (noting political momentum for greater
delegation of environmental authority to states and reduction in size of the federal
government).
234 See Been, "Exit," supra note 38, at 513-14 (describing state and local government
concessions to attract or retain industry).
35 See Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REv. 917, 925-26 (1985).
Professor Stewart has also spoken of federal intervention as justified because of the
existence of a "fiscal commons" problem, under which states would fear providing a public
benefit if other states could forego such expenditures and thereby gain an economic and
associated political advantage. See Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 80, at 1214 n.73.
236 See Buzbee, Remembering Repose, supra note 1, at 41 & n. 16, 55-56 & n.59 (asserting
that an effective regulatory scheme must harness beneficial tendencies and control harmful
tendencies both of regulators and regulated entities).
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sought in federal monetary support. In effect, federal Brownfields grants
further move hazardous waste law toward a defacto cooperative federalism
scheme, reducing the degree of liability uncertainties. Given concerns about
risks of agency capture and even government corruption at all levels,
however, dollar grants or subsidies should be accompanied by oversight and
post-expenditure review.237 The many failures of past and current urban
renewal efforts following federal grants support the need for the tracking of
any grant dollars. 38
In addition, if a national goal of protection from hazardous substances
remains, limited federal oversight of Brownfields and state cleanup initiatives
is appropriate. The current situation of parallel state and federal schemes
unavoidably leads to discounting of the value of Brownfield sites, due to
lingering liability risks. Federal abdication of authority at such sites,
however, would be ill-advised. Rather than requiring dual state and federal
review of each contaminated site, programmatic federal review of state
efforts would make sense to avoid undue taxpayer expenditures for
potentially duplicative efforts.239 Such a programmatic review has numerous
237 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
'3' Government programs that are rooted in social welfare andhousig programs seeking
to staunch the flow of capital out of older industrial areas have generally seen only limited
success. Urban redevelopment projects have floundered. See, e.g., Are Development Zones
Oversold?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1996, at A22 [hereinafter Development Zones] (discussing
how various development and enterprise zone programs "have not been the economic
stimulus they were expected to be" and also reporting New York State Comptroller
discovery of exaggerated claims ofjob creation); Nicholas Lemann, The Myth of Community
Development, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1994, (Magazine), at 27. Municipal redevelopment
agencies frequently have difficulty retaining industry-even industry recently attracted by
the promise of tax breaks and special legal treatment. See John Greenwald, A No- Win War
Between the States, TIME, Apr. 8, 1996, at 44-45 (discussing state versus state competition
for business and reporting instances of businesses provided with special treatment later
moving despite such treatment). Urban empowerment or enterprise zones proposed and
initiated in recent years seek to jump-start stagnant urban neighborhoods, but have achieved
only limited success. See, e.g., Development Zones, supra; Lemann, supra, at 27. For a
general overview of several related "public/private partnership" initiatives aimed at spurring
redevelopment, see generally CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL ALLEN WOLF, LAND-USE
PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE, AND RE-USE OF URBAN LAND 942-64 (1989).
239 See SCHAPIRO, supra note 83, at 77-78 (discussing concerns with duplicative efforts
potentially fostered by the dual governmental authorities under the United States federalist
scheme). Professor Markell has explordthe tradeoffs of moving to a delegated authority
scheme under CERCLA, but based on his interviews with state officials, questions if states
would support such a structure because of the inevitability of ongoing federal oversight. See
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precedents under other federal environmental statutes.24 ° Impacted citizens
and institutions should also retain the right to participate in the cleanup and
rehabilitation decisionmaking process and petition federal authorities to
intervene if a problem arises at a state-supervised cleanup. Such a petition
trigger would serve much of the same function as ongoing governmental
oversight, but at lesser cost and with less bureaucracy.241
Whether these various Brownfields rehabilitation programs will
actually work is uncertain because of the many non-environmental factors
contributing to the creation of such sites.242 Private transactional dynamics
would often create context-specific incentives for private cleanups if repose
were possible. Providing such repose would be a major step in the right
direction.243 Some cleanups, however, are simply too costly to make
economic sense and will not occur unless a private party exists who can be
forced to undertake or finance a cleanup. The many ills of old urban
industrial sites make long-term private investment questionable.
It seems equally obvious, however, that local, state, and federal
officials, as well as owners of contaminated sites, attorneys, and consultants,
all have strong incentives to support Brownfields rehabilitation efforts.
Society would also benefit if Brownfield sites were returned to reuse. The
substantial emphasis on Brownfields rehabilitation in the months preceding
publication of this article, in the form of government publications,
conferences, and several newsletters, reflects the political and economic
bonanza such efforts may promise. All of these individuals and institutions
can gain political or economic advantage from such programs, even if they
may ultimately fail because of other disincentives to reuse such sites. Hence,
I conclude that Brownfields programs will be with us unless proven
ineffective, will actually benefit some industrial ventures, and will aid clean
David L. Markell, The Federal Superfund Program: Proposals for Strengthening the
Federal/State Relationship, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. 1, 74-75 (1993).
240 See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (discussing cooperative federalism
programs).
241 Such a trigger is akin to the "fire alarm" strategies discussed in Mathew D. McCubbins
& Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire
Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SC. 165 (1984), and later in Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins,
Designing Bureaucratic Accountability, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 96-97 (1994).
242 See infra Part I.B.
243 1 have explored elsewhere in greater detail how allowing legal repose could harness
private transactional dynamics to further the federal goal of hazardous waste cleanups at
minimal expense to the taxpayer. See Buzbee, Remembering Repose, supra note 1, at 96.
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up of the environment; but they also will be doomed to frequent failure
because of the many non-environmental deterrents to Brownfields reuse.
D. A Note on Institutional Determinism
In this review of the history and dynamics of local, state, and federal
environmental, hazardous waste, and Brownfields regulation, one finds
different institutions at different points in time appearing innovative or
inflexible, dedicated or lax, active or lethargic. At times politicians passed
laws and amendments that benefited industry but at other times enacted
stringent laws that simply did not fit easily into a capture theory of legislation
and regulation. Similarly, states enacted both stringent laws and laws that in
other contexts appear largely intended to reduce the likelihood of federal
intervention. Several states have actually precluded more stringent state
regulation of environmental hazards. In the Brownfields context, however,
all institutions and individuals involved have strong incentives to pursue
rehabilitation efforts, even if these efforts are of uncertain long-term efficacy.
Instead of our being able to predict federal, state, or industrial
behavior based on a deterministic or static appraisal of the nature of the
institution involved, the particular context in which each institution acted
appears to be at least an equally significant factor in the content of regulatory
enactments. Several decades ago, economics Nobel laureates George Stigler
and Gary Becker wrote a provocative article showing how, even without
individuals' tastes (or preferences) changing, their choices would change and
appear to reflect changing tastes as other variables, particularly information,
changed and modified individuals' assessment of costs and benefits.'"
Consistent with Stigler and Becker's hypothesis, the mere fact of
increased state environmental activity does not necessarily mean that state
officials' preferences or concerns have changed so that federal incentives or
244 See George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, AM.
ECON. REv., Mar. 1977, at 76. Others such as Professor Carol Rose argue that the law
influences behavior and preferences through its teaching function. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose,
Environmental Faust Succumbs to Temptations of Economic Mephistopheles, or, Value by
Any Other Name Is Preference, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1631, 1636 (1989) (reviewing MARK
SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH (1988), and arguing that private preferences are
"surely educable" and thus influenced by public discussion); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking
Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J.
1, 38 (1991) (stating that "our laws are not just our controllers, but our teachers").
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oversight are no longer necessary. States and state officials may only be
reacting to the changed circumstances wrought by the active and ever-
changing dynamics of several decades of state and federal environmental
policymaking.245 For example, as discussed above, much of the federal
government's preeminence and later state innovations could largely be the
result of first-mover phenomenon dynamics, rather than the result of some
major change in the nature of state and federal governments. Similarly,
information that is now widely distributed about pollution threats and
regulatory strategies has changed political, institutional, and electoral
incentives. Particularized contextual analysis, or what Professor Rubin has
called the "microanalysis of institutions," will more likely shed light on
appropriate policymaking choices than would a more static view of how state
or federal legislators or administrators will act.246 Rather than reflecting a
linear progression to greater regulatory wisdom or some correct and stable
allocation of federal and state authority, the history of environmental
federalism shows changing federal and state roles. The efficacy of the
distribution of environmental regulatory authority is inevitably dynamic and
ever-changing. No one correct balance can ever be a static goal.
The distinction drawn here perhaps can be analogized usefully to
changing paradigms in the field of ecology. Analysts of federalism and
proponents of greater state roles sometimes describe heavy reliance on
federal authority in recent decades as a mistaken experiment and speak of a
shift back to a more appropriate and dominant role for the states.24 7 The
underlying conception seems to be one of moving toward a more stable and
245 See Elliot et al., supra note 121 (suggesting that federal environmental laws evolve in
phases, with each phase influencing incentives of actors and succeeding developments);
Rubin, Institutional Analysis, supra note 101, at 473 (pointing out how similarly structured
federal agencies facing similar interest groups may nonetheless exhibit drastically different
cultures and competence).
246 See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1393 (1996).
247 See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Env 't and Pub. Works Subcomm. on Superfund,
Waste Control, and Risk Assessment, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of John C. Shanahan,
Policy Analyst, The Heritage Foundation), available in 1995 WL 10384003 ("Hazardous
waste sites are, at their core, a local problem. If there is any federal environmental law for
which a legitimate case can be made for devolving authority back to the states, it would be
CERCLA."); Patton, supra note 107, at 16 (stating that "[o]ver the past few years, some
members of Congress and state officials have ... advocate[d] substantially diminishing the
federal role in protecting environmental quality-the devolution revolution").
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correct balance of authority.248 Similarly, until the 1980s, the dominant
ecological paradigm was that ecosystems, while sensitive to interruptions or
disturbance, naturally progressed or succeeded to a best and highest state.249
In essence, a sound and undisturbed ecosystem progressed to a biologically
determined balance. This previously dominant paradigm is now in disfavor.
Instead, ecosystems are viewed as constantly dynamic and in flux, with
ecosystem elements and species changing in reaction to other changes in
complex and often unforeseeable ways.25° Modem ecologists now reject the
idea of progression toward or back to a natural balance or stasis.
The view of federalism offered here is analogous to this modem view
of ecosystems. Rather than searching for a single correct allocation of
authority, or viewing a need for changed relationships as reflecting a
mistaken past, we should instead acknowledge that the ever-shifting balance
of federal and state authority is highly contextual and contingent on what has
come before."' No determined static and correct balance will ever be
248 In the context of constitutional federalism scholarship and political debate, the
pendulum analogy is sometimes used to describe changing federalism conceptions. See
Ronald J. Bacigal, The Federalism Pendulum, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 771 (1996); ANNUAL
CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES, THE
COURTS: THE PENDULUM OF FEDERALISM (1979). This article's analysis of the history of
environmental federalism indicates that, at least in the context of an instrumental federalism
analysis, that analogy is inapposite; state and federal roles are not moving toward a stable
and fixed endpoint, as will a pendulum in the absence of a continued application of force,
but are constantly adjusting.
249 See Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 855-57 (1994).
250 See id. at 869; see also Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: Evolution,
Categories, and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325 (1995) (exploring implications of the
new ecological paradigm). The "search for stasis is inevitably frustrated by nature's
dynamic reality." Id. at 340.
21 The shift in federal and state authorities has occurred here without any notable judicial
enforcement or protection of state sovereignty. The progression to greater state authority
buttresses the view of the majority of the Supreme Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In that case, the Court concluded that a state's interests
would be protected by state representatives acting within the federal political system. In
contrast, in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the Court once again stepped
into the political arena to forbid what could be viewed as a self-coercive agreement of state
representatives acting Within the federal legislature forcing the states to take part in the
handling of low level radioactive waste. See generally Rubin & Feeley, supra note 73, at
930-31 (criticizing New York and the Court's federalism jurisprudence and stating that "the
Act that the Court invalidated on federalism grounds was actually a compact among the
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achieved. Instead, ongoing changes in relationships and interactions are
inevitable. Ecosystems will not reach a particular highest and best state;
similarly, under our federalist system, no single allocation of authority
between federal and state authorities will be correct or stable. Different
allocations may best achieve certain goals at particular times, but predicting
how to best allocate authority requires far more analysis than mere
identification of the relevant institutional players.
All institutions now appear eager to develop Brownfields initiatives.
How politically durable that eagerness will be is questionable. If states
develop a successful track record and vigorously protect the environment
while returning such sites to reuse, a fairly stable cooperative federalism
approach may result. If, however, states tend to sacrifice cleanup
protectiveness to attract industry, a wholly different dynamic shifting
enforcement authority back to the federal government may follow. Such a
shift back to greater federal authority would be especially likely if
environmental justice advocates' concerns were ignored by states. Were
federal officials to conclude (in my view erroneously) that overlapping
federal authority was no longer necessary in light of state environmental
activity, the contextual dynamics of environmental federalism would lead one
to predict a reduction in the stringency of state environmental enforcement.
IV. CONCLUSION
The history of Brownfields and hazardous substances policies, and
environmental federalism more generally, shows shifting federal and state
roles and innovations. The federal government's long-term environmental
preeminence cannot be assumed to reflect some inherent institutional
superiority, but instead is partly the product of the federal government's
advantage as the first-mover in enacting substantive environmentally
protective laws. That federal leadership may be attributable largely to
different electoral incentives faced by federal and state legislators. Different
state and federal sensitivity to benefits offered by industry, as well as threats
of migration or bypassed investment opportunities by industry, are also more
immutable differences that explain greater state interest in accommodating
industry concerns. Recently increased environmental competence and
stringency of many states do not, however, justify broad federal
states that they had fashioned by using their undiminished political power").
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relinquishment of an ongoing role in reviewing state environmental activities,
particularly in the Brownfields area. Much of the recent state activity is the
direct result of preceding federal innovations and requirements. Recent state
contaminated site and voluntary cleanup enactments may not solely reflect
newfound environmental sensitivity, but instead reveal a preference of state
officials and industry for more local implementation and enforcement once
federal regulation is the alternative. Nevertheless, giving states the
predominant role in choosing which Brownfields to seek to rehabilitate is a
sound step to avoid wasteful spending on sites that might otherwise soon be
abandoned again. Brownfields initiatives have the potential to provide a
substantial societal benefit, but also confront numerous significant non-
environmental barriers to new investments. Current political support for
Brownfields initiatives, therefore, still should be viewed somewhat
skeptically; federal and state initiatives may offer more political and
transactional benefits to involved institutions and individuals than they will
produce actual long-term rehabilitation of Brownfield sites.
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